

# The EU's multifaceted approach to resilience building in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Security sector reform in Ukraine

Edina Lilla MESZAROS\*, Constantin Vasile ȚOCA\*\*

## Abstract

*The EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy is based on five pillars, one of which prioritizes state and societal resilience to the East and South. However, the promotion of state and societal resilience in its vicinity is not portrayed as a totally altruistic policy, being motivated also by rational considerations, as fragility beyond borders threatens the EU's vital interests, while a resilient state is a secure state, and security is crucial for prosperity and democracy. Accordingly, the current article has set as its main objectives the deciphering of what the European Community understands by state and societal resilience in its neighbourhood, and what mix of instruments is using for achieving it. We have chosen as our case study to examine the efficiency of the EUAM mission in resilience building in Ukraine. Within these lines we advance a multifaceted approach to resilience, as in our opinion, stability and prosperity in the Eastern vicinity cannot be achieved only through Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements, cross-border cooperation projects, various ENP instruments, but also through more active diplomacy, preventive measures and engagement in crises and conflict management under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy.*

**Keywords:** resilience, security sector reform, Ukraine, Eastern Neighbourhood, EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine

## Introduction

As the title of our article suggests, within the current research we propose to investigate the European Union's efforts to build resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Even though the concept of resilience has been a frequently used term by other disciplines, such as ecological studies, in political science, European

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\* Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS is assistant Professor at University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania; e-mail: edina\_lilla@yahoo.com.

\*\* Constantin Vasile ȚOCA is lecturer at the University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania; e-mail: ctv\_i@yahoo.com.

studies and International Relations is a newly discovered paradigm. In regards to the European Union, in the last decade resilience has managed to dominate its foreign policy narrative, especially when it comes to the relations with the neighbouring countries. Its inclusion in policy papers, strategies and joint communications over the years shows the growing salience of the concept. We argue that resilience building has become one of the major foreign policy lines that the Community wishes to follow in the upcoming years. In order to achieve resilience in the vicinity, a multifaceted approach is proposed. This means that the achievement of stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood will be the result of a well balanced mix of policies and actions, combining elements of early warning, prevention and preparedness, risk management, security sector reform with rule of law, protection of human rights, good governance, macro-financial assistance etc. As undertaking an in-depth analysis of all these dimensions of resilience building would be an arduous task, impossible to deliver in a scientific article, due to the existent limitations in length and time, we have decided to focus only on one dimension and to inspect the EU Advisory Mission's (EUAM) role in Ukraine's security sector reform. As our main hypothesis, we argue that the missions undertaken under the auspices of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy also contribute to resilience building in the EaP region. EUAM Ukraine<sup>1</sup>, a civilian mission, could be listed among the policies of assurance under the EU's security governance umbrella, which by targeting good governance, rule of law, fighting against corruption and organised crime, and reforming the judicial system and the security sector as a whole, strengthens the Community's resilience building efforts in the EaP.

As regards to the structure of the research, it is formed of four major building blocks. The first part contains a brief literature review, examining the existent academic literature on resilience. This conceptual analysis allowed us to understand how a concept with a totally different connotation has managed over time to catapult itself from one discipline to another, nowadays becoming a catchword in the EU's global security strategy. In the second chapter we propose a qualitative content analysis of the main EU documents, in order to understand the context in which the concept of resilience was included in the EU's foreign policy agenda and how it gained leverage over time. If in 2012 the Union was dealing with resilience in connection with the food security crisis from the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, in 2020 it has developed a self-standing document dealing exclusively with resilience building in the Eastern Partnership. As underlined before, the last chapter - the case study, examines one angle of the EU's multifaceted approach to resilience, namely its efforts to reform the civilian security sector in Ukraine. In order to get a feedback concerning the efficiency of these efforts, we have also proposed a quantitative analysis, inspecting the results of surveys carried out by Ecorys and funded by the

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<sup>1</sup> Read more on EUAM Ukraine, <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-us/>.

European Commission in February and March 2020, in the EaP countries and implicitly in Ukraine as well.

## **1. What do we understand by resilience? A short literature review**

Thanks to its newly discovered political salience, nowadays ‘resilience’ has become a frequently recalled term, cemented into the European public consciousness. If we look at the multitude of official documents, joint papers and communications issued in the past years, we see that the EU has committed itself to the arduous task of delivering resilience not only within its own borders, but also beyond, especially targeting its immediate southern and eastern neighbours. As highlighted by scholars, the paradigm in question has been present in the academic literature for decades, only that it was mentioned in another context, free from political or foreign policy connotations. Biermann and her collaborators argue that the roots of the concept can be found in ecological studies, the Canadian ecologist and Emeritus Professor, Crawford Stanley Holling using it for the first time in 1973, measuring commotion level that an ecosystem could incorporate before changing its structure and turning into a new condition. As Fareed Zakaria invented ‘illiberal democracy’, Holling coined the concept ‘ecological resilience’. Ecological resilience was described as the amount of perturbation that an ecosystem could resist without changing its self-organized processes and structures defined as alternative stable states (Gunderson, 2000, pp. 425-426). Looking at its trajectory, the term ‘resilience’ has passed through multiple stages of development, acquiring new meanings within ecological studies, before being borrowed by other fields, such as politics or international relations. In ecological studies, it has managed to catapult itself from being a merely descriptive tool forecasting system change over time, to a theoretical framework for the governance of social and social-ecological systems, turning into an important feature of ‘new ecology’. Lately, resilience is being associated with sustainability, climate, natural hazards and disaster management (Biermann *et al.*, 2015, pp. 59-61; Lavrelashvili, 2018, p. 189).

Gradually, the term ‘resilience’ was adopted by other fields as well, conquering foreign policy discourses of Western countries and of highly prestigious international organizations, such the OECD or the United Nations. Back in 2008, the OECD described ‘resilience’ as a characteristic of states, an ability to deal with alterations in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy. These changes could be the result of various shocks or of “long-term erosions (or increases) in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy” (OECD, 2008, p. 17). OECD experts pinpointed that resilience results from a combination of three elements, namely capacity/resources, efficient institutions and legitimacy, backed up by a transparent policy-making that lives up to the expectations of the citizens, by successfully mediating between state and society. They highlight the importance of the social contract, resilience laying in the social contract, as it leads to stability within a country. According to the OECD

specialists, resilience, i.e. successful state building, always emerges as an outcome of proficient domestic efforts, efforts which can also receive a positive impetus in form of a well-aimed international assistance (OECD, 2008, pp. 14, 17-18).

At UN level, resilience has become a central piece of its International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) with the objective of reducing risks that might endanger people and their livelihood. Leah Kimber from the University of Geneva underpinned the existence of a paradigm shift in the 80-90s' involving the concepts of resilience, risk and vulnerability. While the various technological crises, natural hazards and disasters taking place in this period prompted the inclusion of the term 'risk' in the UN's disaster narrative, the concept of 'vulnerability' had begun to lose ground in front of our concept under scrutiny- resilience. While 'vulnerability' was the principal catchword of UN documents dealing with natural hazards and poverty in the 80s', later it was replaced by resilience. In contrast with 'vulnerability', which bears a negative meaning, reflecting fragility and a major risk of exposure, the term 'resilience' rose to prominence as a concept with a positive undertone, enabling the possibility of improvement and recovery (Kimber, 2017, pp. 89-91).

If at first it was associated with climate change reports, disaster management, preparedness and development policy, today resilience has turned into a veritable imprint, marking a new strategic priority in the EU's foreign policy. Petrova, Delcour, Juncos and Korosteleva, all have noticed that in the past decade a shift took place in the Community's foreign policy rhetoric, in addition prompting changes in its external governance towards the neighbourhood (Petrova and Delcour, 2019, pp. 336-337; Juncos, 2017, pp. 1-2; Korosteleva, 2020, pp. 682-683). Accordingly, resilience was promoted to an eminent position within the EU's foreign policy rhetoric. Furthermore, Juncos highlights that introducing resilience within the EU's foreign policy rhetoric coincides with a pragmatist turn in social sciences and global governance (Juncos, 2017, p. 1) Petrova and Delcour argue that this shift is the result of acknowledging the need to streamline the existing resources and to develop flexible policies that could be adjusted in tackling crises or risks of any kind from the EU's vicinity or inside its borders (Petrova and Delcour, 2019, p. 1).

Nathalie Tocci, as Special Advisor to the former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini was actively engaged in crafting the EU's Global Security Strategy and its implementation in the following years. In one of her recent works, she has tried to respond to the frequently articulated questions in the academic literature concerning resilience and its newly discovered place in the Community's foreign policy agenda. When exposing the rationale for choosing resilience as one of the five guiding principles of the Union's core security strategy, she has enumerated three reasons. First of all, she emphasized the imperativeness of the EU having a *joined-up role* on the global scenery. Apparently, resilience fits well in this new demeanour of the Community targeting a global outreach and a greater role in the global conflict management. As highlighted by Tocci, the new security

strategy of the EU was intended to be global not only in its denomination, but also through its actions and policy directives, driving a change in the traditional foreign policy, defence and development nexus, by externalizing domestic policies from “research and infrastructure, to energy, climate, and trade” (Tocci, 2020, pp. 177-178). Even if it was a term already used by other academic disciplines and empirically it was interpreted in different ways, resilience had one broadly accepted meaning, namely the capacity “to adapt, respond, react and bounce back in the aftermath of shocks and crises” (Tocci, 2020, p. 178). Resilience emerged as a linking word, bringing together policies related to security, development and humanitarian actions and communities under the aegis of the Global Strategy.

*Principled pragmatism* was recalled as the second reason for implementing resilience in the Union’s foreign policy agenda. According to the Special Advisor, the entire security strategy is based on the principle of pragmatism. This pragmatism is translated by the need of the EU to adopt a more realistic vision concerning its place in the world in light of the impelling geopolitical mutations and threats. Namely, the EU cannot stick only to conducting a foreign policy based on normative, economic or humanitarian considerations. A more practical approach is needed if the European Community genuinely wants to get engaged in solving the problems of the neighbourhood, transforming them into prosperous and stable countries. The EU had to acknowledge that its traditional enlargement, Europeanization and neighbourhood policy are not enough to help states and their societies facing and recovering after shocks and crises, thus pointing towards resilience building (Tocci, 2020, pp. 179-180).

Finally, Tocci motivated the shift towards resilience as a result of its inherent dynamic nature and of acknowledging the fact that no political entity can control everything in its surroundings. This has prompted the introduction of the concepts of *change*, *risk* and *uncertainty* in its policy documents, followed by the identification of possible ways of prevention and management (Tocci, 2020, pp. 179-181).

Juncos argues that after metamorphosing between and within disciplines, in politics and IR studies the concept of resilience could be mainly perceived as a new, agog form of governance or governance from a distance. Without disregarding the salience of preventive measures, the acceptance of uncertainty propels states to be prepared for potential risks and threats and to develop adjustment and recovering capacities. More precisely, resilience requires states and societies to embrace change rather than to cut it off from their agenda (Juncos, 2017, pp. 5-6).

Departing from Junco’s observations, in the current research we argue that especially when it comes to the Eastern Partnership countries, resilience building could be perceived as a form of security governance. Moreover, we contend that the performance of security governance related actions under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy can be also considered as strategies enhancing resilience in the neighbourhood.

In order to prove our hypotheses, following a thorough analysis concerning the gradual implementation of the term resilience in EU policy documents, strategy papers and joint communications within a case study, we shall examine the efficiency of the EUAM mission in supporting Ukraine's security sector reform. We argue that the encouragement of implementing sound reforms in the security sector could be perceived as actions promoting resilience in an EaP country.

## **2. How resilience is communicated in the EU documents and what does the Community understand by it?**

In this part of the study, we propose undertaking a qualitative analysis of joint communications and policy documents elaborated by the competent EU authorities in the past decade, investigating how the concept of resilience has gained prominence over the years, gradually becoming a major guiding principle in the Community's approach towards the Neighbourhood.

### **2.1. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crisis**

Since its inclusion in the Global Security Strategy, 'resilience' has become a buzzword, outlining not only a new direction in the EU foreign policy, but also the assumption of a greater and strengthened role in the close neighbourhood, and thus implicitly a shift in the EU's international actorness. However, we find reference to this concept in earlier papers as well, such as *The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crisis* from 2012, an official document of which elaboration was prompted by the necessity to efficiently address the recurrent food crises in the Sahel region and in the Horn of Africa. As the EU is more than just a customs' union or a common single market driven by economic and political benefits and it also manifests as an entity based on rules, norms and values, the compliance to these rules is a basic requirement, shaping both the relationship between Member States and with third countries and partners. Through its normative nature, the European Community is one the world's largest foreign aid donors, but because the demands for assistance considerably surpass the available resources, providing conflict-prone regions only with supplies (varying from food, medicine, and medical equipment, agricultural or other commodities) it's simply not enough. Authorities from these countries are also being compelled to implement strategies in their national policies and planning meant to build resilient societies and states. Accordingly, the Commission understands by resilience "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks" (European Commission, 2012, p. 5). Unfolding the concept under scrutiny, the specialists point out its double dimension, highlighting its (European Commission, 2012, p. 5):

- endurance - emphasizing the innate power of an entity (which can be an individual, a household, a community) to better endure factors provoking stress and shocks;
- rebound: highlighting the ability of an entity to recover and make a successful comeback following shocks and stress.

In the communicate, the Commission's experts argue that vulnerability can be reduced by increasing the entity's powers, or by diminishing the severity of the impact following shocks and stress, all these aiming at increasing resilience. Thus, they propose a multifaceted strategy, which not only focuses on the development of fast coping and adjustment mechanisms ex-post shocks, but also prioritizes the reduction of risks and factors leading to crises. At the same time, specialists emphasize that embracing measures and implementing policies which contribute to resilience are very economical, as preventing the root causes of crisis is much cheaper than damage mitigation following emergencies, notwithstanding the positive impact it has on the citizens from conflict-prone regions. Food security, nutrition, social protection, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction are only a few of the fields in which resilience strategies are of an outmost importance (European Commission, 2012, pp. 2-3). Supporting Horn of African Resilience (SHARE) and l'Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience - Sahel et Afrique de l'Ouest (AGIR) represent two of the earliest community initiatives supporting resilience in the Sahel Region and in the Horn of Africa (European Commission, 2016, p. 1).

## **2.2. The Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020**

*The Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020* was intended to implement the goals set within the Communication from 2012 and pointed towards the need of establishing more constructive policies building resilience. This was to be achieved by a mix of three components, namely: humanitarian actions, durable development cooperation and continuous political commitment. One of the biggest innovations brought by the Action Plan is that besides giving new impetus to critical fields, such as disaster risk reduction, nutrition security, social protection and climate change adaptation, it linked resilience to the objectives set under the UN's framework, the Millennium Development Goals (after 2015 these were replaced by the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). and to the Hyogo Framework for Action (United Nations, 2007).

The Action Plan set out three major priority actions in order to strengthen regional resilience capacities and to reduce the fragility of crisis-prone countries (European Commission, 2013, pp. 4-6):

- The first priority envisaged *EU support to the development and implementation of national resilience approaches integrated in National Development Plans.*

Namely, this foresaw the gradual incorporation of Community principles in national programming decisions.

- The second one targeted *Innovation, learning and advocacy*;
- The last established the *Methodologies and tools to support resilience*.

### **2.3. The EU's Global Security Strategy**

As underlined before, 'resilience' occupies a central place in the EU's new ground-breaking foreign and security policy paper, the Global Strategy, alongside other four pillars, such as: internal security, integrated approach to conflicts and crises, cooperative and regional orders and global governance for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Looking at the European Neighbourhood Policy blueprint, the promotion of state and societal resilience in the eastern and southern vicinity seems as a deliberate plan to further enhancing peace and stability in the neighbourhood, and with this to assure the unhindered functioning and growth within the European Community. Compared to the first document attempting to promote a holistic approach to security at community level, the European Security Strategy (European Security Strategy, 2003), the Global Strategy is a bolder and more ambitious plan. If the ESS was a review of the international security environment, of the five major threats to the security of the Union and their possible ways of management, the Global Security Strategy shows us the image of a more mature and assumed international player, that wishes to actively engage in the handling of crises from its vicinity. State and societal resilience in the neighbourhood is described as a strategic priority to the EU, and it targets both countries from the closer neighbourhood that envisage having stronger bonds with the European Community, and those which favour a more limited cooperation. The pursue of a multifaceted approach to resilience also appears in the document; it will be achieved through the implementation of tailor-made policies, which foster the protection of human rights, enable inclusive and accountable governance, state of law, target the reforms initiated in the justice, security and defence sectors and support capacity-building efforts in fragile states etc (Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 25-26).

A similar interpretation of resilience can be found within the Global Strategy as in the Commission's Communication from 2012, describing it as an ability of states and societies to reform and recover from crises of an internal/external nature (Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 24-28). Resilience building is presented as a win-win policy for both the EU and the countries from the neighbourhood, as on the one hand, it will lead to prosperity, democracy and buoyant societies in the vicinity, and on the other hand, it will contribute to stability at the EU's external borders, enabling the persistence of sustainable growth within the Community. However, resilience is echoed as a more complex concept, comprising no just actions involving state institutions ensuring sustainable security, but also each individual and the society as a whole. At the core of a resilient, self-sustaining state lays a resilient society



favouring democracy, with a solid trust in state institutions and a strong commitment to achieve sustainable growth. As pinpointed in the Strategy, the European Neighbourhood Policy, a credible enlargement and a more effective migration policy are amongst the critical means needed to achieve state and societal resilience outside the Community (Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 24-28).

In the same train of thought, looking at Kirchner and Dominguez's classification concerning the four types of security governance functions (assurance, prevention<sup>2</sup>, protection, compellence), foreign aid and development assistance together with the European Neighbourhood Policy and its instruments, and illegal migration control could be perceived as policies of prevention (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011; Kirchner, 2011). The European Neighbourhood Policy combines both Kantian principles with the traditional security approach promoted by Arnold Wolfers. Namely, while the first are aimed at reducing the likelihood of conflicts between states and extending world peace, the second favours the creation of a safer milieu which exceeds the Community boundaries. Thus, according to this reasoning, the promotion of state and societal resilience in the neighbourhood could also be perceived as policies of prevention under the aegis of the EU security governance.

When inspecting its level of success concerning the implementation of the set objectives, a year after its elaboration, the Global Strategy has managed to live up to the expectations of its developers, effectively contributing to state and societal resilience building in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Among the successful resilience building actions in the East is listed the assistance provided by the EU in Ukraine's security sector reform (EEAS, 2017).

#### **2.4. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action**

To illustrate even more the Union's genuine commitment to resilience building in the vicinity, it prompted the issuing of a joint document in 2017, crafted by Commission experts and the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, putting forward *A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action*. As specified in the introductory part of the communication, its main purpose was to identify the ways in which the adoption of a strategic approach to resilience could enhance the EU's external action footprint in matters concerning development issues, humanitarian, foreign and security policy objectives. Harnessing the theoretical knowledge and practical experience gathered in resilience building over the years, the authors were led to acknowledge the urgent need to adopt a more structural approach to vulnerabilities, focusing on activities involving anticipation, prevention and preparedness (Joint

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<sup>2</sup> Policies of prevention deal with the root causes of conflicts and they promote democratization, civil-military relations, mediation, migration, humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation.

Communication, 2017, p. 1). Among the main lines of action set within the communiqué we find (Joint Communication, 2017, p. 4):

- the extension of the contribution that the EU external policy can make to enhance the resilience of partner countries and their citizens;
- the use of positive examples of resilience building from its domestic policy in promoting stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood and in improving sectoral policy dialogue with partner countries;
- the assurance that the EU external footprint, besides contributing to stability in the neighbourhood, also fosters resilience within the Community borders.

The experts highlight the importance of investing in inclusive and participatory societies, as they will lead to the set up of accountable and democratic state institutions, this also decreasing the likelihood of the eruption of violent conflicts (Joint Communication, 2017, p. 4). To *economic resilience* is rendered a central role within the strategic approach, as besides stability in the political, societal or security sectors, a diversified economy with a secure energy supply is needed together with the adequate contingency plans and measures in order to have a resilient state. Only a state with macroeconomic stability and sound democratic institutions can successfully survive internal or external emergencies of any kind. Circular economy, foreign direct investments and the creation of a proper environment for the establishment of small and medium enterprises are listed among the measures leading to economic resilience (Joint Communication, 2017, pp. 5-6). Furthermore, the document underscores the necessity to intensify the contribution of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy to resilience building, through training and capacity building activities supporting Security and Development Initiatives (Joint Communication, 2017, p. 9).

## **2.5. Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience - an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all**

In 2015 we witnessed a major revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a whole, in line with the Commission's Political Guidelines for 2019-2024, which targeted to further strengthen the bonds between the Community and its neighbours from the South and the East. The Eastern Partnership was revolutionised, as well, at the EaP Summit from 2017 by adopting a common reform agenda, which was aimed at delivering 20 tangible results until 2020, improving the lives of citizens from the EaP countries by strengthening cooperation in the field of economics, governance, connectivity and at society level as well. In the EU's newest document, entitled *Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience - an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all* elaborated in 2020 it is reiterated the main rationale behind the establishment of the EaP, namely "to build an area of democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation based on common values" (Joint Communication, 2020, p. 1). Special attention is paid to the rule of law, protection of

human rights, the fight against corruption and discrimination, to having an independent media and civil society and to the promotion of gender equality, as these are quintessential for having resilient states and societies in the EaP region. The newly reviewed ENP's leitmotiv, the *incentive-based approach* ('more for more' and 'less for less') also stays at the basis of the relationship between the European Community and the Eastern Partnership, namely those partner countries that will engage in substantial reforms will receive more, while those which will choose not to implement the desired reforms will get less (Joint Communication, 2020, p. 1). The EU has developed various conditionality clauses in order to encourage state compliance. The scheme is very simple: reinforcement by reward opposed to reinforcement by punishment. By *negative conditionality* we understand the suspension or completion of benefits in case of non-compliance by a target country, while *positive conditionality* means the distribution of benefits as a reward for compliance, meaning the performance of a recommended behaviour (Mészáros, 2017, p. 62).

This document is the result of a broad consultation, containing the opinions and inputs received from the specialists from Community institutions and representatives from both EU Member States and EaP countries, thinks tanks, academic institutions and civil society. Strengthening resilience in the Eastern Partnership countries is presented as an "overriding policy framework" and its achievement is forecasted through the implementation of five policy objectives, thus continuing the multifaceted approach to resilience building (Joint Communication, 2020, p. 4):

- through sustainable and integrated economies;
- through accountable institutions, rule of law and security;
- through environmental and climate resilience;
- through digital transformations;
- through resilient, fair and inclusive societies.

Concerning the first objective, sustainable and integrated economies, the economic relations between the EU and the EaP countries are outstanding, as the trade volume has doubled between them in the past decade, the EU being the main trading partner for four EaP countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and the second for the other remaining two (Armenia, Belarus). The basis of future economic relations between the two parties will constitute the existent Association Agreements (and other trade agreements) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas; however, the European Community wishes to achieve the progressive regional and bilateral integration of the economies of the EaP countries by using measures targeting climate neutrality. Not just Member States, but also partner countries will be able to enjoy the benefits provided by the European Green Deal and the Digital Strategy, all intended to modernize the EaP countries' economies and to make them more progressive and competitive. Furthermore, the EU is committed

to give assistance to its Eastern neighbours in times of economic crisis through Macro-Financial Assistance (Joint Communication, 2020, pp. 5-6).

As highlighted in the second objective, good governance, rule of law, democratic institutions, efficient anti-corruption measures and fight against every form of organized crime constitute the backbone of a resilient state and society; they also represent the necessary preconditions for sound economic investments and enable sustainable growth. Besides the constant commitment to assist the EaP countries in initiating and implementing reforms in the judicial field and in the fight against corruption and organised crime, the EU has pledged to increase support for security dialogues and cooperation. Organized crime is presented as a common challenge; accordingly, its prevention and management should be the result of joint efforts. In order to tackle this challenge, the Community suggests enhancing cooperation with the appropriate EU justice and home affairs agencies and the implementation of steady reforms in the security sector. Integrated border management (with visa facilitation and readmission, mobility partnerships, labour migration initiatives) is also meant to help countries from the Eastern Partnership to resist pressure and to improve their resilience. As the EU is committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the vicinity, it will strengthen its peacebuilding efforts through joint actions, involving also women and young people in these actions, putting forward the implementation of the Women Peace and Security Agenda. Under the umbrella of its security governance, the Union will implement policies of assurance, prevention, protection and compellence in the area under investigation, emphasizing conflict prevention and confidence building measures and the facilitation of peaceful conflict settlements. Attention is rendered not only to digital innovations and transformations, or eGovernance in the EaP region, but also to resilience building in the cyber security sector, by implementing strict EU legal, policy and operational frameworks. The authors of the joint communication also raise the possibility of closing tailored roaming agreements with the EaP countries, thus facilitating even more the people-to-people contacts, by easing the communication between them (Joint Communication, 2020, pp. 9-14).

In regard to citizens, the Community favours a transparent and participatory (collaborative) governance model, in which citizens are involved in the decision-making process and can decide in matters concerning their everyday life.

### **3. The European Union Advisory Mission's role in Ukraine's security sector reform and resilience building**

When the founding fathers established the European Coal and Steel Community they did not foresee that besides an economic and political role the supranational entity could embrace other ambitions, such as military or crisis management ones. The end of the Cold War, the mutations in the international security environment and the multiplication of threats compelled the Community to

reconsider its traditional civilian-normative feature and to create a common ground for the expression of foreign and security policy aspirations. This led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as the newly born European Union's second pillar in 1992. The need to play a more active role in the prevention and management of crises from its vicinity gave an impetus to the emergence of the operational arm of CFSP, the ESDP or European Security and Defence Policy in 1998, nowadays known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The first ESDP operations were launched in 2003- the EU gradually taking over the lead from NATO and UN led missions in the Balkans. In 2020 the EU boosts with 17 on-going CSDP missions, 11 of which are civilian missions, while 6 have military purposes (EEAS, 2020, pp. 1-2).

According to the classification put forward by Kirchner and Dominguez, the EU is undertaking four types of security governance related activities such as: *assurance*, *prevention*, *protection* and *compellence*. The civilian CSDP missions, which are primarily responsible for assisting countries in their security sector reform, training police/legal staff (judges and customs and excise agents) in post-conflict environments could be listed among the policies of assurance. The currently active civilian CSDP missions are the following: EUBAM in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, EUAM in Ukraine, EMM in Georgia, EUBAM Rafah in Palestine, EUAM in Iraq, EUBAM in Libya, EUCAP Somalia, EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUPOL COPPS Palestine, EUAM RCA Central African Republic. Activities involving mediation, early warning, sanctions, nuclear and chemical disarmament, irregular migration control, humanitarian assistance, enlargement, the closure of Association and Trade Agreements together with the actions taken under the auspices of the ENP could be considered as policies of prevention. Among the policies of protection we find the strengthening of border control, police and judicial cooperation. Policies of compellence or coercion are represented by the military operations conducted under the auspices of the CSDP (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011).

Given the multitude of policies and actions, within the current research we endeavour to examine only one dimension of the EU's multifaceted approach to resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood by analyzing the EU Advisory Mission's role in Ukraine's security sector reform. Looking at its civilian nature, EUAM Ukraine could be listed among the policies of assurance under the EU's security governance umbrella, contributing to resilience building in an EaP country, Ukraine.

Even Nathalie Tocci mentioned in her paper that when it came to the Eastern Partnership and resilience, the high level discussions were dominated by issues related to the reform of the security sector, hybrid threats and cyber security (Tocci, 2020, p. 187).


The EUAM mission in Ukraine became operational on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2014, following an official request issued by the Ukrainian government. Its main aim is to provide assistance to the Ukrainian authorities in implementing a sustainable

reform in the civilian security sector based on the principles of good governance set by the Union (EUAM Official Site). Bryden and Hänggi from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces understand by security sector reform (SSR) an effort “to turn a dysfunctional security sector into a functional one, thereby reducing security deficits (lack of security or even provision of insecurity) as well as democratic deficits, lack of oversight over the security sector” (Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p. 27). The European Commission and the High Representative in a joint communication from 2016 described it as “a process of transforming a country’s security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the heart of power relations in a country” (Joint Communication, 2016, p. 2)

The civilian security sector in Ukraine is formed of law enforcement and rule of law agencies like the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Police, Border Guard Services, Security Service, General Prosecutor’s Office, local courts, anticorruption bodies, furthermore, representatives of the civil society and of the parliament also play a role in this matter. As highlighted in Figure 1 the mission has five main priorities and three areas of cooperation (EUAM Official Site):

- Giving strategic advice related to civilian security sector reform for the development of civilian security sector strategies;
- Provide assistance in the implementation of reforms: hands-on advice, training, projects;
- Enhancing cooperation to guarantee that reform efforts are coordinated with Ukrainian and international partners.

Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits from the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University in Rotterdam, applied the Whole of Society Approach (WOS) to the EU’s security sector reform and peacebuilding efforts in Ukraine. WOS as an analytical framework is modelled after the human security approach perceiving security as a feedback to a wide range of threats. According to the WOS approach, any mission aimed at delivering a successful security sector reform must meet three criteria. The existence a certain degree of political stability is the first requirement, while the second condition calls for an efficient combination of pragmatism and idealism in the SSR agenda. The technical train-and-equip approach is the last requirement, referring to the SSR programmes’ functionality (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018, p. 456).

**Figure 1. Main priorities of the EUAM Mission**

Source: EUAM, *Main Priorities of the EUAM Mission*, [euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/our-priorities/](http://euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/our-priorities/)

Analyzing its progress, it can be ascertained that since its initiation in 2014, EUAM has managed to deliver positive results in Ukraine concerning the reform of its civilian security sector (EUAM Official Site):

- EUAM provided proactive legislative support to the Ukrainian authorities, assisting them in the drafting more than 40 laws;
- EUAM was a key partner in the elaboration of 25 strategic documents, among which we find the National Security Law, MoIa Strategy 2020, Development Strategy of the National Police, Witness Protection Programme and the SSU Reform Concept and Action Plan etc.
- The EU’s civilian CSDP mission enabled the introduction of a community policing and training approach in the policy guidelines of the Ukrainian National Police;
- Besides introducing the concept of ‘dialogue policing’ in the public order, the EUAM has also proved to be very efficient in the management of public events, implementing also the ‘graduate approach’, EU specialists working hand in with their partners from Ukraine;

- The EUAM staff had successfully participated in the reorganization of the criminal investigations units of the National Police by combining operatives and investigators following the EU's good practices;
- The mission targeted to increase public trust and support in the police, by establishing quick response teams, thus decreasing police response time to citizens. Such quick response teams were deployed in Lviv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi and Volyn;
- Among the missions' achievements we could also enumerate the introduction of the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment programme in order to enhance the capacity of the authorities to fight organised crime;
- Furthermore, EUAM has provided its Ukrainian partners with equipment worth more than 3 million Euros, and since its deployment, it has provided training to law enforcement /rule of law agents.

Naturally, besides achievements, there are certain fields in which EUAM had been criticized for not providing enough or not providing at all. Critics refer to the missions' apparent *low profile*, especially when it comes to the operational level. When the Ukrainian government requested the deployment of an EU led mission in 2014, they thought that the operation would be larger in scope besides assisting the Ukrainian authorities in implementing reforms in the security sector. Assistance was supposed to be delivered in the defence sector as well, helping the monitoring of the administrative line between Crimea and Ukraine. Due to divergence of opinions between the EU member states (mainly because of the countries' stance towards Russia) concerning the form of intervention, made it impossible for the mission to target more ambitious goals in Ukraine. Driven by its traditional conflict avoiding approach, the EU didn't want to enhance tensions with its powerful Eastern neighbour, Russia. Thus, the EU launched a civilian advisory mission in Ukraine targeting the reform of the security sector, without intervening in the ongoing conflict from the eastern part of the country. Some pundits observe that even if the mission was launched as a response to the newly contouring security conditions following the annexation of Crimea, it was operationalized separately from it. Namely, the Ukrainian authorities were expecting from the mission to "do more and differently", but got less from the EU; however, the existing domestic and international conditions pressured them to accept the terms that the Union was willing to offer (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018, pp. 462-464). On the other hand, the EU also acknowledges that several challenges lay ahead, hindering obstacles in front of the successful deployment of the mission and the delivery of the set objectives. EUAM experts emphasize on the "unwillingness and resistance to change, gaps in legislation, insufficient funding, unsatisfactory professional standards, a lack of coordination between agencies, and the prevalence of corruption" (EUAM Official Site).

Additionally, we must not forget that for the implementation of sound reforms in any field, a genuine commitment is needed from both parties. Without a real




implication from the Ukrainian authorities and the civil society, the operation is doomed to failure. The specialists salute the Ukrainian authorities for implementing reforms in the anti-corruption, police and judicial fields, however, they point out that the prevailing lack of trust of the people in their political, law enforcement and judicial agencies demands further actions and perhaps even more efficient ones.

Analyzing the results of the *EU Neighbours East Annual Survey Report* from 2020, implemented by the Ecorys Consortium and funded by the European Commission could give us a glimpse concerning the general perception of the 6 EaP countries about the EU, its presence in the region and the efficiency of its policies. This could be also perceived as an index (measurement) of its resilience building efforts in the EaP and implicitly in Ukraine.

Figure 2 describes the general perceptions of the EaP countries about the EU, according to which the EU's general image is positive, on average 49% of the respondents viewing favourably the European Community. Moldova is fore-runner with 61%, while Belarus tail-ender with 38%. Ukraine (figure 3) scores a decent 51%, 20% of the interviewees having a very positive and 31% a fairly positive, 35% stating neutral feeling towards the Union. On average (70%), the vast majority of respondents from the EaP describe their relations with the EU as good, Armenia (86%, figure 4) scoring the highest, even though Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are the three signatories of the Association Agreement.


**Figure 2. The general perception of EaP countries about the EU (in percentage) Spring 2020**



Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, pp. 10-11<sup>3</sup>


<sup>3</sup> EU Neighbours (2020), *East Annual Survey Report, Regional Overview* (retrieved from <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/publications/opinion-survey-2020-regional-overview>).

**Figure 3. General perception of the Ukrainians about the EU**



Source: EU Neighbours, *Ukraine*, 2020, pp. 8-9<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 4. How would you describe the relations that the European Union has with your country? Spring 2020**



Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, pp. 14-15

<sup>4</sup> EU Neighbours (2020), East Annual Survey Report, Ukraine (retrieved from <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/publications/opinion-survey-2020-ukraine>).

**Table 1. EaP countries trust in different international organizations-Spring 2020 (in percentage)**

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine	EaP countries average
<b>European Union</b>	60	41	45	69	63	66	60
<b>United Nations</b>	54	31	41	57	40	52	48
<b>NATO</b>	32	25	23	59	21	50	42
<b>Eurasian Economic Union</b>	51	26	39	27	33	26	29

Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, pp. 13-14.


Table 1. presents a ranking of international organization based on trust and it reveals that even at the level of the 6 EaP countries with 60%, the EU is the most trusted organization. After Georgia, interviewees from Ukraine (with 66%) ranked the EU as the most trustworthy international entity, while the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union scored only 26%.

**Table 2. Does the European Union provide your country with financial support?**

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine	EaP countries
<b>Yes</b>	65	30	41	71	82	62	57
<b>No</b>	17	34	33	7	6	27	26
<b>Don't know</b>	18	36	26	22	12	11	17

Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, p. 16


**Figure 5. Perception about the effectiveness of the EU's financial support in the EaP countries 2020 Spring**



Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, p. 17


Looking at Table 2, we see that as regards to financial support, 57% of respondents from the EaP recognize that the EU has provided financial help to their countries. In Ukraine this number is the third, at 62%, lagging behind Moldova and Armenia. But when asked about the efficiency of this financial support, only 46% of the respondents from Ukraine answered favourably, 49% expressing their doubts (figure 5).

**Figure 6. Common beliefs of EaP country residents with a positive image of the EU**



Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, p. 41


**Figure 7. To what extent would you say that your country has benefitted from the current EU support in the following areas?**



	Improved democracy	Greater economic development	Access to more products and services	More tourism	Improved infrastructure	Improved trade	Better education	Greater employment opportunities	Improved agricultural production	Less corruption	Better law enforcement	Improved quality of the healthcare system	Improved quality of the justice system
■ Armenia	60	62	66	68	60	60	60	49	54	54	54	64	47
■ Azerbaijan	36	41	49	69	42	56	52	33	45	23	38	40	37
■ Belarus	26	28	47	57	33	62	45	43	26	15	23	36	19
■ Georgia	45	40	56	76	64	46	55	34	38	28	37	53	55
■ Moldova	34	32	57	49	48	45	49	42	35	19	26	40	28
■ Ukraine	34	20	65	63	30	56	35	35	28	13	31	27	20

Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, p. 47

**Figure 8. Areas in which the EU should play a greater role**



	Improved democracy	Promote economic development	Access to more products and services	Increase tourism	Improved infrastructure	Improved trade	Better education	Greater employment opportunities	Improved agricultural production	Reduce corruption	Promote better law enforcement	Improved quality of the healthcare system	Improved quality of the justice system
■ Armenia	15	39	8	22	10	13	36	22	24	25	9	43	16
■ Azerbaijan	13	25	6	34	9	25	46	32	13	14	6	25	4
■ Belarus	14	49	19	21	10	33	24	42	9	14	15	36	4
■ Georgia	15	47	3	14	6	9	36	42	27	15	8	42	15
■ Moldova	10	40	6	6	30	13	26	29	11	45	14	43	19
■ Ukraine	11	57	7	9	15	9	15	34	26	43	13	31	13
■ EaP total	12	50	8	14	14	15	22	35	21	34	12	33	11

Source: EU Neighbours, *Regional Overview*, 2020, p. 47

As highlighted earlier, the fight against corruption represents a pivotal part of the EUAM's objectives; figure 6 reveals that 33% of EaP citizens with a positive view of the EU strongly believe that the Community is genuinely committed to fighting corruption, 48% also somewhat believe that, too. Furthermore, 38% strongly (and 46% somewhat) believe that integration with the EU would enhance their country's security and stability. 72% of those surveyed from Ukraine share the common view according to which EU integration would foster security and stability in their country. Also 72% of the Ukrainians strongly/somewhat trust the EU's pledge to efficiently fight corruption (East Annual Survey Report, Regional Overview, 2020, pp. 21-22). When asked, to what extent did their country benefit from the current European Union assistance (figure 7), Ukrainian interviewees put access to more products and services and tourism as the main areas, while only 20% mentioned improvement in the quality of the justice system, and 13% less corruption. On average 50% of the respondents from the 6 countries named the promotion of economic development as the area in which the EU should deliver more and should play a greater role (figure 8). Reducing corruption was the third biggest preoccupation with 34%, however better law enforcement and the improvement of the quality of the justice system are among the last areas in which the EU is supposed to play a greater role. However, respondents from Ukraine are above the EaP average, 43% demanding a more enhanced EU role in the fight against corruption, 13% want a better promotion of law enforcement, 13% casting their vote for the improvement of the quality of the justice system, these elements being related to the reform of the civilian security sector (East Annual Survey Report, Regional Overview, 2020, p. 47).

## Conclusions

By including it as one of the five guiding principles of the EU's security strategy, resilience building in the neighbourhood has turned into one of the major foreign policy hard lines. The prospect of enlargement, integrated migration management together with the policy instruments of the ENP all have one objective in common, namely to build resilient states and societies in the vicinity, and thus to ensure an unhindered economic growth and functioning inside the Community. Within the current inquiry, we were wondering how the Union could contribute to resilience building in the EaP through its CSDP missions? As EUAM's mandate is to achieve a sustainable civilian security sector reform in Ukraine, we have attempted to link civilian sector reform to resilience building. We have departed from the presumption that the backbone of a resilient state is good governance, protection of human rights, rule of law, trustworthy and accountable law enforcement and judicial agencies. Assessing the EUAM's achievements, on the one hand, we have ascertained the existence of a genuine commitment from the EU to deliver sound reforms in Ukraine's civilian security sector, while on the other hand it was also acknowledged

the dedication of the Ukrainian partners. Since its debut in 2014, sound reforms were delivered in the aforementioned sector, however both parties agree that more is needed in the future. The existence of a bona fide commitment from the EU is reflected also in the answers given by those interviewed in the EU Neighbours survey from 2020, the EU being ranked the most trustworthy international organization in the EaP countries. However, it is a rather controversial fact that even though the Ukrainian respondents do not disregard the importance of fighting against corruption and organized crime and they also cast their vote in favour of improving the law enforcement and the judicial system, the main priorities constitute the promotion of economic development and better employment opportunities. So, in conclusion, we may state that the EU's resilience building efforts in the EaP (Ukraine), though not perfect, are producing measurable achievements; also its partners must be committed and set their priorities straight. Accordingly, we argue that resilience building is always the result of a two-sided effort: of someone who wants to deliver it, and of another who is willing to undertake the necessary changes and reforms to achieve it.

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