The ‘Expertisation’ of European Studies. A critical perspective on discursive institutionalism

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Abstract

The paper puts into perspective the conceptual evolution of European Studies and one of its latest theoretically based approaches, Discursive Institutionalism. It argues that in the field of European Studies expert frameworks aiming for ‘answers’ are overshadowing the intellectual efforts striving for ‘questions’. This tendency undermines the proper identification of problems and it also erodes the effectiveness of proposed policy solutions as these recommendations lack the appropriate conceptual foundations. The paper stresses that this negative trend of ‘expertisation’ is particularly relevant nowadays, when the European Union is undoubtedly struggling with challenges of social disengagement, and that research projects are required to apply approaches that can adequately reveal people’s cognitive-normative understandings and ideationally driven praxes, as well as, most importantly, the generative causes behind EU-sceptical attitudes.

Keywords: European Studies, Discursive Institutionalism, constructivism, European Union, Social disengagement

‘And we have just one world, but we live in different ones’
Mark Knopfler

Introduction

The paper elaborates a theoretical argument about how the dominance of applied research set-ups in European Studies is influencing the discipline’s conceptual evolution, and how the same tendency undermines the effectiveness of proposed policy solutions. The argument addresses these dysfunctional logics and dynamics in the case of Discursive Institutionalism (DI), which is considered as one of the latest research designs of European Studies. Despite its critical stance, the paper recognises the contributions of DI, while it tries to add a new perspective to the concept (or even beyond that, in a more general sense). The basic hypothesis

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which will be developed below is that in the field of European Studies, because of the orientation favouring applied approaches, ‘expert’ and ‘intellectual’ tasks are not distinguished enough. While experts are supposed to elaborate answers and solve problems, intellectuals are rather aiming to pose the right questions, i.e. to define problems without misleading ambiguities (Žižek, 2013).¹ However, in European Studies, due to the continuous demand for practical, reflective, and conclusive policy recommendations, expert and intellectual tasks are not complementing each other sufficiently. Instead, a constellation pervades where experts are enclosed into prefabricated and unexamined frameworks, while intellectual work is degraded to the elaboration of underpinning concepts to these already theory-determined contexts. To understand how this happens, it should be noted that European Studies as a discipline is unavoidably associated with the process of European integration. The constant and in many senses ultra-rapid expansion of the European Union (EU), both geographically and institutionally, is requiring immediate and adequate expert inputs to the ‘toolkit’ kinds of strategies and policy interventions. In this constellation, real-time answers are needed for already defined problems. And these logics and dynamics are leading towards the ‘expertisation’ of European Studies. The expectation is not to be uncritical, but to be solution-oriented. However, is it possible to propose comprehensive enough expert recommendations if the intellectual tasks of (re-)identifying and (re-)interpreting already pre-articulated problems are ignored? Is it possible to map the alternatives for decisions if the exploration of choices is insufficiently done? This argument neither suggests that there is a hegemonic mechanism in the background, which masters the function of questioning while assigning the role of answering to various agents, nor puts forward a radical statement that without intellectually problem-identification proposed solutions one can hardly proceed beyond symptomatic treatments. What it claims, though, is that European Studies are continually sliding into a swirl of

¹ The notion of ‘expert’ should be understood as how Max Weber argued about the roles of ‘academics/scholars’ in Science as a Vocation. Weber (2004) said that scientific results stem from routinized ‘practical activities’ respect certain rules and commitments. Rules about rationally-logically reasoned mode of argument and language/notion use, and commitments towards the theoretical-methodological exploration and explanation of the smallest possible details. Therefore, science expects specialization and problem-solution from the ‘academics/scholars’. In contrast, an ‘intellectual’ is similar to Georg Lukács (1974) ‘essayist’, who is focused only on questioning, on asking ‘life’ itself (directly, without any artistic or scientific mediation), and not looking for answers. Lukács’ ‘essayist’ reminds us that the contingent realm of facts is always subjectively conceptualized in theory-laden ideational framings; facts could never be scientific objectivities in a sense of exploring knowledge from the world-out-there by specialized and systematized ‘practical activities’. It is absurd to believe that one human being is more in touch with something nonhuman and objective than another human being; no, knowledge always remains subjective.
'expertisation', and this trend is eroding the discipline’s scientific uniqueness and reliability.

1. European Studies’ concepts under the influence of ‘Expertisation’

In the early stage of European Studies two concepts were dominating the field (Cini, 2007a). The so-called federalist/confederalist approach focused on the mechanisms and conditions of establishing a ‘European United States’ usually with strong normative contents and political motivations (Burgess, 2007). These interpretations have never been really outdated, there are still relevant works with this perspective (see, for instance, the ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ literature from Beck and Grande, 2007; Delanty, 2003, 2005, 2016; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; or Rumford, 2007, 2008). The other approach that was favoured in the pioneer phase, yet later it lost its scientific attractiveness, is Neo-functionalism heralded by E.B. Haas (1958). It proposed an empirically examinable framework based on the aspects of 1) integration spill-overs, 2) socialisation of the elites, and 3) roles of NGOs and interest groups in supranational level processes (Stroby-Jensen, 2007). All three neo-functionalist theories claimed that due to some interdependencies at the European level (e.g. institutional task- and competence-sharing, supranational networking and capacity-building, internalisation of technocratic praxes, status- and agency-preservation, options for interest-representation, etc.), the progression of supranational institutionalisation could proceed in a self-initiating way even in times of socio-political challenges to integration (Rosamond, 2005). Accordingly, Neo-functionalism seemed to be a reflective framework to grasp the dynamics of supranational institutionalisation.

However, during the ‘80s and the ‘90s, based on a neo-realist turn, Neo-functionalism was strongly debated by Inter-governmentalism (Cini, 2007b). The latter emphasised that international arenas are still based on the Westphalian logic of sovereign nation-states’ actorness, thus the focus should be shifted from supranational institutionalisation to multi-level governance (Nugent, 1999). Inter-governmentalism, thereby, added the national perspective to European Studies’ concepts, and put the emphasis on supranational and national nexuses, i.e. on top-down (downloading) and bottom-up (uploading) mechanisms, and on institutional harmonisation and divergence (Moravcsik, 1998). The inter-governmentalist shift was just an intermezzo to a more comprehensive conceptual change, which was the start of the neo-institutionalist era of European Studies. Although this latter approach is very much debated recently, it is still considered relevant, most probably due to its stable theoretical frameworks, well-established methods of empirical operationalisation, as well as data accessibility and comparative capacities (Grunhut, 2017).

All three forms of Neo-institutionalism, i.e. Historical Institutionalism (HI), Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) are frequently applied in studying the institutional constellations of the multi-level
European polities, politics, and policies (Sitterman, 2008). The neo-institutionalist turn did not challenge the mostly structuralist ontological and epistemological framings of European Studies, although agents and agency, especially in RCI’s and SI’s interpretations, have gained much more focus (Börzel and Risse, 2003). HI addresses the progression or regression of institutional reforms in a longer timeframe (Mahoney, 2000). Its lens is the ‘logic of path-dependency’, which claims that agents are following regularised patterns and routinised practices at the same time. Therefore, the change can be both gradual and immediate, yet a reform could hardly proceed as long as the formalised constraints (e.g. regulations) and the informal references (such as social values, norms, and conventions) are in competitive relation (North, 1990). In line with this, HI considers these structural junctures (socio-political turning points) as the main subjects to research, and how these incremental or abrupt pressures affect internally and externally, i.e. both from the inside and the outside, the institutional context (Fiori, 2002).

RCI interprets the agency from the perspective of ‘the logic of calculation’ that draws attention to the agents’ rationality and their interest-based pursuit of maximising gains and minimising losses (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). RCI highlights that the institutional context continuously pushes agents into interactive situations and motivates them to take actions. In these ‘trials’, agents are evaluating and comparing their options (Weingast, 1998). Therefore, actorness has the potential to dynamically reproduce the institutional context; however, it could also contribute to certain changes if rationality justifies them. RCI interprets the emergence of reform-needs the same way like HI; socio-political processes, both internally and externally, are constantly challenging the existing institutional framework, yet RCI does not emphasise the constraint of path-dependency; it underlines, instead, rationality as the agency of change (Shepsle, 2005).

Finally, the third type of Neo-institutionalism, SI explains subjective actorness by the ‘logic of appropriateness’, which indicates that agents are following social values, norms, rules, taboos, codes, customs, conventions, routines, ideas, narratives, etc., as patterns (March and Olsen, 1989). SI claims that the rather informal (or intangible) constraints, transmitted and learned through socialisation and internalisation, are the dominating patterns framing agency. The agents’ stances and praxes are both (not determined, but) strongly influenced by these informal references, as subjects first construct culturally framed perceptions and interpretations, i.e. cognitive-normative ideas before they take any action based on these individual understandings. Accordingly, SI highlights that an institutional change proceeds if the socio-political processes reach the level of informal patterns (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

What the three types of Neo-institutionalism have in common is that they all assume that agency is motivated by something external to the subjects, let it be path-dependency, rationality or cultural patterns (Lowndes, 2010). This is a clearly structuralist interpretation that remains unchallenged even if a complex or
synthesised version of these approaches is applied, as suggested by some scholars (Jupille, 2006; Kauppi, 2010). This criticism has invited Discursive Institutionalism (DI) to propose a much more agent-based theoretical and analytical framework.

The basic conceptualisation of DI was completed by Vivien A. Schmidt (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2012, 2017), although some authors, especially Hay (2001, 2006) about Ideational Institutionalism and Constructivist Institutionalism, Jabko (2006) about Strategic Constructivism, and Campbell and Pedersen (2001), who even proposed the name Discursive Institutionalism for their approach, were progressing on the same path. DI is combining three fundaments into a concept: (1) ‘ideas’, i.e. the cognitive-normative understandings frame individuals’ actions; (2) ‘discourses’, i.e. the communicative interactions of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing, or debating, translating, arguing and formulating ideas through contestation and deliberation; and (3) ‘institutions’, i.e. the context that shapes both the substances of ideas and discursive actorness. Those who are questioning the innovativeness of DI (see for instance: Bell, 2011, 2012; Larsson, 2015) claim that due to the framing capacity of institutions, admitted by Schmidt as well, the relevancy of ideas and discourses is only secondary in understanding and explaining institutional constellations and changes. Those who apply DI state against this criticism that institutions function as a framing context, yet these structures are not static but dynamically constituted; probably reproduced but potentially produced (modified) through purposeful actions (Schmidt, 2017). Accordingly, Schmidt (2010) stresses that the source of agency is not something external to individuals (logic of path-dependency, rationality or cultural references), but rather an internal critical and reflexive subjectivity. Even this capacity of the self is framed, yet it cannot be reduced to some deterministically shaped logics. In line with this, referring to Bourdieu, Schmidt says that individuals are neither predictable agents, nor spontaneous actors, but both. Therefore, scholars inquiring institutional constellations and changes - Schmidt (2008) continues - need to be more reflective than to use ingrained pre-conceptualisations, assumptions and interpretations. Beside the institutions as structures, both the substances (contents) of ideas and the dynamic agency of discursive actorness should be considered as well.

DI should not be seen as a simple post-structuralist shift in European Studies (Lynggaard, 2012; Schmidt, 2017). Of course, it has connections to this stream, but it may be more important to note that DI is also related to Critical Realism (Schmidt, 2011a). The two are conceptually compatible, insofar as both approaches accept pan-relationalism (i.e. the understanding that subjects and objects, and even more crucially the subjects-objects vis-à-vis nexuses are existentially interlinked) and anti-representationalism (i.e. the idea that nothing is represented to the subject from its objective, natural or social surroundings, but everything is presented/constructed by the subject itself; consequently, there is a ‘world-out-there’ that impulses the subject, but without a knower there is no knowledge on it) (see: Archer, 1995; Collier, 1994; Grunhut, 2019; Vandenbergh, 2014). This is why DI is more than just a
methodological approach, since it - like Critical Realism - prioritises a dynamic theoretical openness (epistemological flexibility) based on inputs from the existentially interlinked and subjectively constructed ‘reality’.

This brief overview suggests that from Functionalism, through Institutionalism, to rather constructivist interpretations, i.e. from structuralist frameworks to more agent-based approaches, a comprehensive trend of theorisation in the field of Social Sciences defines the conceptual evolution of European Studies. However, it should be noted that these conceptual shifts are interestingly linked to certain challenges to the European polities, politics, and policies as well. Neo-functionalism emerged in European Studies when a more general intellectual trend was appreciating some revised (and rather integrative) functionalist conceptualisations. This was the era after the Second World War with optimistic plans about how to achieve stable peace, prosperity, development and justice in the Western hemisphere. Functionalism aimed to conceptualise these ambitious reform endeavours about how to build up new institutions, more just societies, more efficient welfare systems and more democratic political mechanisms. Not ‘reality’ (Sein), but ‘expectation’ (Sollen) about structures was the generative logic of these theorems. Meanwhile, European integration urged prompt expert answers about how to proceed with the erratic supranational institutionalism, how to create institutionalised forms for European cooperation beyond bi- and multilateral national partnerships, and how to overcome the turbulent political debates that threatened the already achieved progression. Neo-functionalism was a trendy and also adequate analytical framework for these much needed expert inputs.

Then, in the ‘80s, a neo-structuralist stream has unfolded by favouring intellectual conceptualisations about how things actually are, rather than how they should be. It was the era of remarkable changes all around the world. Everything turned to be dynamic and fuzzy, to some extent fluid and boundless due to Globalization. This neo-realist lens contributed to the emergence of Inter-governmentalism and particularly Neo-institutionalism. Both of these approaches frame structures and agents in closed and predictable constellations. These intellectual trends were also satisfying for experts in the field of European Studies. The European project became a powerful agent in international arenas, a complex super-state later formulated into the EU in the post-Maastricht era. During this time experts were urged to deliver immediate answers about how to build up and maintain an EU-wide or even more extended multi-level, multi-sector and multi-actor governance structure, and also about the diverse features of institutional harmonisation and top-down/bottom-up (downloading/uploading) mechanisms in various policy fields. Neo-institutionalism was a theoretical and methodological ‘panacea’, broad and reflective enough, to be applied in these expert tasks of providing policy recommendations for the institutional stabilisation of the EU.

Lately, a similar conjunction supports the emergence of DI. Constructivist concepts are debating the relevance of structuralist approaches, since our era of Late,
Second or post-Modernity undoubtedly undermines the traditional semantics and ‘grand narratives’ of particular cultures (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). Globally and locally relevant interdependencies and flows contribute to certain institutional abstractions (of universalism) that question the reliability of routinised individual ideas and praxes based on traditional references (Beck, 1992, 1998; Giddens, 1990, 1991). Static concepts cannot frame these social processes any longer. Theories should be opened up for new, more dynamic ontological and epistemological understandings. In the meantime, experts of European Studies are yearning for approaches that can support their efforts to address and tackle new kinds of challenges to the EU, namely social disconnections, distrust, legitimacy crisis, democratic deficit, i.e. various forms of disengagement (Boyce, 1993; Hug, 2016; Katz, 2001; Magnette, 2003; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Norris, 2011; Schmidt, 2013). Neo-institutionalist interpretations cannot frame these problems due to their structuralist perspective that ignores agency and subjectivity. DI’s great achievement is that it has recognised this inability and has proposed a more agent-based ideational and discursive turn. It reflects on the needs of the EU to understand people, to take into consideration their identities, perceptions, cognitive-normative ideational substances, narratives and justifications, their discursive constructs and actorness. DI seems to be an adequate approach to answer the aforementioned challenges of disengagement. Yet, it should be examined if this latest shift in the conceptual evolution of European Studies is just another phase of ‘expertisation’ or DI really embraces the intellectually developed constructivist content.

2. Discursive institutionalism in a critical perspective

As it was said above, DI has three pillars: ideas, discourses and institutions (although Schmidt lately integrated power into the concept as well - see: Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). In Schmidt’s (2008) understanding, ‘ideas’ refer to narratively formulated cognitive-normative frameworks based on individual perceptions and interpretations about ‘things’, ‘events’, and ‘others’ in one’s objective, natural and social surroundings. Accordingly, ideas are functioning as subjective justifications to actorness. Schmidt (2010) distinguishes three levels of ideas. The policy level refers to rather technical substances. These contents are easier to debate. Proposed alternations usually do not trigger comprehensive normative-ideological contestations as practicability is the main function of these ideational components. The programmatic level means much broader substances. Schmidt (2010) uses the Kuhnian notion of paradigm to describe this level of ideas. While policies could be quite simply and quickly modified after falsification, these programmatic components are significantly harder to change, not necessarily due to their strong normative content but because a revision would shake other underpinned ideational aspects as well. Finally, the philosophic substances are rather background contents; their discursive contestation is usually triggering tense normative-ideological
disputes with limited chance for consensus. Compromises on and reflexive re-thinking of these latter ideational components are very demanding to the agents.

As it seems, Schmidt (2008) interprets these substances in connection with political discourses about institutions. Her objective is to propose a framework that could anticipate reform success or failure. The described ideational components have a lot to say about the intensity, normativity, resiliency, and persuasive nature of the communicative interactions. Obviously, the more the political discourse involves programmatic, not to mention, philosophic substances as debated arguments, the more the chance to establish a broad consensus is decreasing. Accordingly, Schmidt relates these ideational contents to discursive agency, i.e. to the actoriness of influencing the flow of communication. She differentiates two basic forms of political discourses. ‘Coordinative discourses’ are rather technical, sorts of ‘elite’ negotiations involving a narrower pool of agents, mostly policy-makers such as members of advocacy groups and epistemic communities, stakeholders, and decision-makers. Coordinative discourses are mostly dealing with policy level ideational substances. The debate is usually consensus-oriented with professional focus, applied framings, and problem-solving aspirations (sometimes also because oppositional opinions are excluded). ‘Communicative discourses’, on the contrary, are mobilising from a much broader pool of agents as these ‘social pressure’ or ‘peer pressure’ negotiations are about deliberation, persuasion, and legitimation. Civil society or generally the mass population is purposefully involved in these rather intense, normative-ideological, and contesting discourses.

Moving forward to the third fundamental component of DI, the institutional context, depicts how Schmidt (2008; 2010) is linking her approach to the ‘older’ versions of Neo-institutionalism. She highlights that the agents, indeed, are acting in a structurally framed ‘reality’ of formal (tangible) and informal (intangible) institutions. These structures, exactly like Neo-institutionalism claims, are shaping both the ideas and discursive agency of individual subjects. Yet, Schmidt continues, this nexus should not be seen as a static framework, otherwise the various institutional changes and also the historically contextualised emergence of the current institutional constellation would be unexplainable. She stresses that structures and agency are shaping each other in a mutual way, actoriness is framed but not determined [cf. Giddens’ (1984) theory about structuration]. To theoretically support her approach, Schmidt (2008; 2010) invokes, on the one hand, Searle (1995), who emphasises that institutions are ‘products’ but cannot be taken out of the process of continuous ‘production’. Therefore, institutions are just as much internal as external to agents, who are creating perceptions and interpretations about these constraints. This should be understood as an intentional agency of hierarchizing institutions (cf. Schmidt’s differentiation about policy, programmatic, philosophic level of ideational substances). Of course, this subjectivity is framed by social-cultural expectations, but cannot be mechanistically determined. Based on this individual hierarchy of internalised institutions, agents have the subjective ability to
commit themselves ideationally and practically to constraints or references that are valued as more important to them (these institutions will be reproduced by a good chance), while they could consider other logics, semantics, and narratives flexibly (these institutions will probably be produced/modified if the situation requires it).

To enrich Searle’s argument, Schmidt (2008; 2010), on the other hand, builds on Wittgenstein’s concept about certainty. This is not one of the main theoretical innovations of the Austrian-born philosopher, yet Schmidt realises that his distinction ‘between language games based on our experience in the world, for which radical uncertainties rarely occur, and those based on our pictures of the world, […] which can involve radical uncertainty’ refers to a discursive agency that differentiates between rather inflexibly and more flexibly internalised knowledge or ideational substances (Schmidt, 2010, p. 11). Beyond the aspect that this approach is closely related to Searle’s (and therefore to her) interpretation about hierarchized ideational contents, it is also linked to discourses, i.e. to the narrative actorness of interpreting, understanding, translating, and debating various meanings. This conceptual opportunity enables Schmidt to distinguish the agent’s ‘background ideational abilities’ and the ‘foreground discursive abilities’. The former should be seen as the internalised ideational substances trace back to the framings of the institutional context, while the latter abilities are critical and reflexive capacities to discursively deliberate and contest ideas.

It is interesting to note that just in relation to the institutional features Schmidt acknowledges that ideas are not floating by themselves, but they are internalised by individual subjects, who are discursively interpreting and reinterpreting, i.e. arguing, debating, translating, learning-understanding these narratively formulated and articulated knowledge. She rightly emphasises the different symbolic and semiotic relevancies of ideational contents (the policy, programmatic and philosophical level). However, Schmidt still does not recognise that this knowledge is not just a construction, but also a constitutional fundament for the individual subject. Examining the narrative content of these ideas and the performance to discursively formulate these constructions is agent-based just to the extent that it perceives that institutions represented in ideational forms are not static but dynamically changeable through communicative interactions among agents. Referring to Searle’s and Wittgenstein’s theories, Schmidt proposes the differentiation between background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities, yet what she analytically put up for investigation is actually nothing more than objectified qualities of communicated ideas (to examine if these contents belong to the policy, programmatic or the philosophical level) and discursive actorness (to analyse if the discourse is rather coordinative or communicative in nature). Her approach is not interested in the agents as subjects. Only in their narratives and communicative performances about arguing (deliberating, contesting, imposing, negotiating, etc.) ideas. She only tries to anticipate the outcomes of discourses about institutions.
Probably Schmidt does not promise more from the beginning. However, if this is the case, then her framework is just slightly agent-based, and the criticism against DI, which says that it is a mere methodology, seems right. Schmidt’s rather moderate shift towards Constructivism is, in fact, not exploited well. The framework is focusing too much on the discursive formulation of constructed ideational substances in order to predict outcomes of communicative interactions, and, based on these gathered data, to foretell possible institutional changes (or to anticipate the failure of these reforms). The agents have only secondary importance in this concept to instrumentally understood ideas and discourses. The importance of background ideational abilities are realised by DI; so why the narratively communicated ideational substances in a given discourse are relevant instead of the coherency or discrepancy of the involved agents’ cognitive-normative ideas in the various (policy, programmatic and philosophical) levels? Foreground discursive abilities are similarly conceptualised; so why the coordinative or communicative nature of a given discourse and its deliberative, hegemonic, consensus-oriented, ideological, etc., quality is relevant instead of the aspect if the involved agents’ internalised ideas are enabling them for reflexivity and critical actorness or not? In the current form, DI seems to be more of an expert approach aiming for answers based on ideational data gathered from discourses, than an intellectual concept striving for identification of problems about agents’ culturally (institutionally) shaped subjectivity.

3. The unrealised reflexive capacities of discursive institutionalism

By highlighting the importance of background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities, DI has the conceptual capacity to examine the individual subjects’ reflexive and critical agency. However, the efforts to provide reflective and conclusive answers about possible institutional reforms overshadow this research objective. ‘Expertisation’ in this sense undermines the more comprehensive intellectual task of identifying problems about how potential social pathologies already distort individual ideas at a philosophical level, and due to that also respective to the programmatic- and policy-related ideational substances (examining the background ideational abilities), and how the subjects’ reflexive and critical agencies are also paralysed because of these twisted normative-cognitive understandings (inquiring foreground discursive abilities). The urgency for applied recommendations makes DI analytically treating ideational contents and discourses in an instrumental way (separately from the examined agents’ subjectivity). Scholars applying DI in this reduced sense cannot properly address the relevant agents’

2 Schmidt does not propose an in-depth analytical framework on the skills, tactics, communicative strategies and methods of discursive actorness. It is possible to invoke certain theories, for instance: Fligstein (1997), to fill this gap. However, from the perspective of this criticism not discursive actorness matters, but the more fundamental reflexive and critical agency of the subjects involved in the analyzed communicative interactions.
undistorted/distorted reflexive and critical capacities since ‘expertisation’ is pressuring them to put aside their own reflexive awareness and critical agency! How? (1) Scholars aiming for reflective and conclusive answers have to search for ‘Truths’. They cannot expand the list of problems with more uncertainties; on the contrary, they need to believe that their findings are verified. (2) Since they are striving for ‘Truths’, they have to neglect that their own selves are also culturally-institutionally framed; their perspectives, ideas and praxes are shaped as well. Neither the agents, i.e. the research objects, nor the scholars, i.e. the research subjects are ‘untouched’ in this constellation.

The paper draws up very briefly two multi-theories about points (1) and (2) mentioned above. To start with the first, members of the classic generation of the Frankfurt School, most notably Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, devoted an impressive scholarship to the critical argument that the age of Enlightenment is actually a flawed narrative labelling certain understandings as ungrounded metaphysics while it claims that the rationale of ‘science’ is a guarantee to search for ‘Truths’ in the objective, natural and social realms (see: Schmid Noerr, 2002; Abromeit and Cobb, 2004). In the positivism dispute of the early ‘60s, Habermas, a frequently cited author of DI, stressed that, against the critical rationalist argument of Popper, the methodology-focused, positivist research framework, striving for repeated attempts of falsification in order to indirectly verify scientific assumptions/explanations, is eventually an instrumental-technical way to reproduce the existing structures (Adorno et al., 1976). Habermas (1987) emphasised that this form of scientisation, which aggressively questions the reflectivity of other approaches, is rather a legitimacy-establishing tool in the hand of powerful agents, who gain the utmost advantages of the current institutional constellation. During the dispute Adorno claimed that a critical research stance needs to be reluctant to empirical inquiries and has to prioritise ontological-epistemological conceptualisations. Habermas rather focused on the importance of communicative interactions in the public sphere. He highlighted that, instead of deliberation, political and public discourses, due to these destructive contributions of objectivity- and reflectivity-vindicating scientisation, are distorted idea-impositions of powerful agents in order to legitimise and reproduce their hegemonic statuses (Habermas, 1990). Habermas’ argument is related to Foucault’s theory about ‘govern-mentality’ that describes how the Power-based narrative and performative capacity of certain agents enables these influential subjects to disciplinary judge others and their ideas and praxes (Foucault, 1991). In Foucault’s overarching, historically contextualised concepts, the role of scientisation is understood like in Critical Theory’s interpretation, insofar as he also emphasises that expert knowledge is serving as a technical-statistical instrument in the hand of dominating actors to disciplinary administer, register and influence other agents and their understandings about the objective, natural and social realms. Following this path, Beck (1992) suggests that not a reflective, but rather a reflexive scientisation is needed as part of a more
The ‘Expertisation’ of European Studies. A critical perspective on discursive institutionalism.

In this new era, the ‘logic of ambiguity’ is replacing the ‘logic of unequivocalness’, while the institutionalised dualities and coordinates of the ‘either/or’ categorisations are being broken down by the ‘both/and’ model embracing concepts that complement and blend with each other (Beck and Grande, 1997). This shift is not a simple change but a ‘meta-change’, inasmuch both (classic) modernity and reflective scientisation are fundamental preconditions to this reflexive turn. Therefore, a dialectical incorporation creates those ‘side-effects’ that lead to the emergence of reflexive modernisation and scientific progression. This self-transformation theorem embraces three interlinked main components: ‘Risks’ are pervading the whole social realm as at all level (ontologically at the value-based level of ‘worldviews’, epistemologically at the cognitive-normative level of ideas, and methodologically at the level of praxes) an unfolding ‘Individualisation’ contributes to the freedom of autonomous subjectivity against patterns of traditional logics and semantics, while the references of particular cultures are undermined by this constellation’s generative core process of ‘Globalization’ that triggers universal and cosmopolitan abstractions (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). Reflexive scientisation, applied in this Second or Late Modernity, inspires an interdisciplinary shift that questions the claims about unequivocal explanations (‘Truths’) pronounced by self-declaredly ‘more objective’ disciplines, paradigms, concepts, theories, methods, and vocabularies.3

However, reflexive scientisation is based on contributions from scholars who have reflexive and critical capacities. These individual subjects, first and foremost, are aware of their own constituted identity. Foucault, as it was already said above, conceptualises Power as a phenomenon existing in discourses, interactions, relations, and socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-moral structures (Mills, 2003). Neither the subject, nor its agency is independent from this Power, since the continuous procedural constitution of the individual self occurs in these general frameworks; the subject cannot escape the ‘world’. Agency is not determined, the subject has the actorness to confirm/negate various optional theoretical positions (narratives/performances) about its own self-conceptualisation. Yet, this subjectivity is not separable from Power. In line with this, Butler (1995) stresses that reflexive self-awareness could make the subject capable of fully deconstruct and reconstruct itself in countless times, but not autonomously from the Power-based general constellation. To strive for something universal beyond the particularly

3 Guzzini’s argument should be considered here: ‘Data does not speak for itself. In fact, any data is an observation that is already theory-laden.’ (Guzzini, 2017, pp. 6–7) Analytical knowledge is tempted to assume a single epistemic world. It believes that even though explanation of facts is theory-dependent, yet, somewhat miraculously, the world-out-there can constitute itself as neutral ground for empirical tests between theories. However, not only data, but observing and gathering data is already theory-laden. Therefore, before the research subject (scholar) would theorize its research object (the observed unit) for an empirical test, subjective framings are already driving and influencing its conceptual agency.
contextualised forms of Power is most probably doomed to fail due to the hidden penetration of the very same hegemonic Power - Butler underlines. "The term "universality" would have to be left permanently open, permanently contested, permanently contingent, in order not to foreclose in advance future claims for inclusion." (Butler, 1995, p. 8). Therefore, it is more progressive if the agent reflexively reminds itself that its own subjectivity is based on confirmations/negations, and by critical efforts for self-emancipation, the negated substances could be disentangled from their negative meanings. Through these dialectical revisions, what is ‘excluded’ should be critically reassessed, as the liberation of the ‘Other’ from these negated features (otherness) is the only way to emancipate the self, to understand the agency of self-constitution as an infinite and limitless subjective freedom. As Foucault highlights, the subject is a genealogical construction that undermines its own subjectivity if it considers itself as the sole foundation of its individual existence. On the contrary, the self needs to enrich its subjectivity through the recognition of the Other (Mills, 2003). In line with this, Butler emphasises that:

[M]y position is mine to the extent that “I” […] replay and resignify the theoretical positions that have constituted me, working the possibilities of their convergence, and trying to take account of the possibilities that they systematically exclude. But it is clearly not the case that “I” preside over the positions that have constituted me, shuffling through them instrumentally, casting some aside, incorporating others, although some of my activity take that form. The “I” who would select between them is always already constituted by them (Butler, 1995, p. 9).

Furthermore, Butler stresses that these framings are not merely theoretical products; on the contrary, these are organising principles constituting (giving meanings to) the subject’s whole viability. The delusional attempt to fully leave the matrices of Power does not lead to individual freedom, but to total social detachment.

The subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is a logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. […] The subject is constituted through acts of differentiation that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside… (Butler, 1995, p. 12).

When DI points to the importance of background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities, it highlights the culturally-institutionally shaped subjectivity of the individual self, while it also respects the agent’s similarly framed,
yet not determined reflexive and critical actoriness. This perspective fits into the constructivist turn that requires reflexive awareness and critical agency from the scholars. However, ‘expertisation’ undermines this shift by urging reflective and conclusive answers based on verified ‘Truths’. In this sense, ‘expertisation’ not just prevents DI to unfold its constructivist theoretical content, but it also stimulates scholars to ignore their existential embeddedness. Searching for ‘Truths’ that could vehemently support outcomes formulated as policy recommendations diminishes scholars’ reflexive awareness and critical agency about their own selves. Those who are looking for ‘Truths’ will find them. This rather explicit constrain does not contribute to self-reflexivity, and without an individual stance like that, scholars cannot reveal agents’ reflexive and critical actoriness either. On the contrary, it makes them rather ignore agents and understand the logics, dynamics, and mechanisms, the whole general constellation of the social realm, through instrumental framings explained from a contemplative position. In the case of DI these theoretical framings embrace linkages between objectified qualities of ideational substances and discourses entirely separated from the examined agents.

The previous multi-theoretical arguments purposefully referred to concepts from Adorno, Habermas, Beck, Foucault and Butler, as all these theorists tried to lay bridges between structuralist and constructivist frameworks by accepting that structures and agents are continuously shaping each other. Schmidt (2008, 2010) suggests the same as an outmost novelty of DI against the ‘old versions’ of Neo-institutionalism. The importance of background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities in the concept are highlighted in order to address this special context of dynamic structuration. However, ‘expertisation’ constrains scholars to neglect their existential embeddedness, while due to this detached position it also makes them ignoring agents. The focus is simply on the structures; instrumentally framed ideas and discourses that could dynamically predict possible changes about rather statically understood institutions (surely not in an agent-based sense). To consider agents and agency is against the logic of ‘expertisation’ as it would create contingencies. An approach that genuinely strives to understand people, their subjective perceptions and interpretations, their individual expectations and justifications, their multi-layered cognitive and normative ideas and their praxes easily ends up in proposing further questions that need to be clarified and refined, rather than providing conclusive answers that can support recommendations about urgent policy needs. This is why neither reflexive scientisation, nor scholars’ self-reflexivity is favoured by ‘expertisation’.

4. Discursive Institutionalism in the Trap of ‘Expertisation’. Discussion

As it was mentioned before, DI’s emergence in European Studies is linked to the current trend of challenges to the EU, namely to civil disconnection, distrust, legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit, i.e. disengagement. European integration
has to face a growing social dissatisfaction that traces back to multi-dimensional disapprovals of different EU policies, interventions, strategies, etc. The distance between the EU as an entity and member states’ and third countries’ citizens ever increasing. This unfortunate trend benefits nationalist, isolationist, protectionist, and EU-sceptical political movements. People are turning away from the EU, the confidence in its supranational institutions is shrinking, while political voices advocating for disintegrative measures are using the EU as a ‘threat’ in their narratives. Fears, angsts, anxieties, disinformation, and misrepresentations about various EU policies are purposefully triggered by these political movements aiming for popularity at the cost of the European integration. If the EU is about multilateralism, then these movements are striving for unilateral agency; if Europeanness is about cosmopolitanism based on the ‘both/and’ logic of diversity, inclusion, tolerance, acceptance and consensus-building, then these movements are promoting distastiation along the ‘either/or’ binaries of sameness/otherness, exclusion, prejudice, rejection, and idea-imposition. DI’s adequacy about these social challenges is grounded in its agent-based orientation. The ‘old versions’ of Neo-institutionalism are focusing too much on structures, and this ignorance of the agents’ actorness makes it harder to detect the dynamic processes and efforts for changes - as Schmidt (2008, 2010) stresses. If the EU is struggling with social disengagement, then exploring and theorising people’s expectations, motivations, justifications, perceptions, interpretations, etc., i.e. cognitive-normative ideas formulated in discourses is a progressive scientific endeavour that could describe and anticipate social praxes more precisely. However, the difficulty remains because ‘expertisation’, as it was said, bypasses this claimed agent-based character of DI. Without focusing on the coherency of the agents’ multi-layered (i.e. policy, programmatic, and philosophical level) ideational substances; without an in-depth inquiry of the agents’ more or less flexible ideational contents that could enable/hinder their reflexive and critical agency; and without concentrating on the agents’ ideationally grounded praxes, the anticipation of politically relevant outcomes of discourses about ideas is only telling details about institutions understood as something external to the agents. These efforts cannot reveal how structures and agents are shaping each other; it merely assumes the possible results of decisional processes.

Searching for ‘Truths’ about these communicative interactions among agents in order to provide reflective and conclusive answers as policy recommendations is nothing more than reproducing the analysed discourses from a contemplative position. ‘Expertisation’ encourages scholars to take the status of professional ‘spokespeople’ gathering ideational data, reconstructing arguments, building up narratives, and then, based on these inputs, to propose scenarios for solutions. Yet, the difficulty is that this claimed ‘spokesperson’ status is not independent but rather detached. Detached from the agents as research objects, and detached from the applier research subject itself as well, who is also an individual agent existentially
embedded into its own objective, natural and social surroundings. Scholars cannot reveal ‘Truths’, but only subjective justifications. It is important to listen to Richard Rorty about this differentiation:

…we can tell you about justification, but can’t tell you anything about truth, there’s nothing to be said about truth. We know how to justify beliefs, we know that the adjective “true” is that we apply to the beliefs we have justified. We know that a belief can’t be true without being justified. That’s all we know about truth. Justification is relative to an audience regarding truth-candidates, truth is not relative to anything. Just because it is not relative to anything, there’s nothing to be said about it.4

When ‘expertisation’ is pushing for ‘Truths’ in order to support well-established answers, it actually facilitates the ‘either/or’ logic of distantiations. European Studies is favouring DI because it could help to conceptually understand and explain agents’ ideas and discourses, and thanks to that it could also support efforts against social disengagement. However, ‘expertisation’ distorts all these reflexive and critical capacities and reproduces the very same pathological social praxes of exclusion, prejudice, rejection and idea-imposition that the European integration has to struggle with. It is time to realise that the EU’s weak social embeddedness is due to the conflict-laden discursive contestations of incompatible ‘Truths’. Giving up the practice of Truth-vindication is the precondition to achieve deliberative justification as a progressive communicative interaction in the public sphere. Recommendations relying on ‘verified and objective Truths’ would not eventuate reliable EU policies that can overcome the challenges of social disengagement, because ‘Truths’ are subjective beliefs aimed to be imposed on others without deliberative justification. ‘Expertisation’ is part of the problem that it tries to solve.

Neo-functionalism, Inter-governmentalism, Neo-institutionalism all worked adequately as conceptual backgrounds in European Studies under the prime influence of ‘expertisation’. Why? (1) Because all of these approaches are structuralist; (2) since ‘expertisation’ is rigidly demanding structuralist answers based on ‘Truths’ revealed and examined from a contemplative position; and (3) because the most significant challenges to European integration were mainly structural problems in these eras between the ‘50s and ‘90s (building up and sufficiently maintaining supranational institutions, achieving multi-level institutional harmonisation, establishing well-oiled governance - downloading, uploading and cross-loading - mechanisms, etc.). However, since the EU enlargement and particularly after the world financial crisis of 2007-08, the challenges of distrust, legitimacy and democratic deficit, etc., cannot be swept back

under the rug again. These problems of social disengagement ask for an agent-based conceptual shift that DI tries to proceed by its contributions but ‘expertisation’ distorts all its reflexive capacities. Quo vadis European Studies? Providing answers or proposing the right questions, finally.

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