

European Union: fears and hopes

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Abstract

This contribution analyses some data from Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015, especially to draw a map of Fears. The European Union is a divided space and one of the main consequences of the budget (financial) crisis of Greece, followed by the crisis caused by the arrival of thousands of immigrants is an enhanced communication difficulty between the Western and Eastern parts of the EU. But all citizens have some new rights with the European Citizenship, which are additional. One of the main issues for the future could be to change the fundamental basis of the Union, thus trying to organize a new articulation between local and supranational, with another role for States, for example to change the organisation of European elections, and to pursue the connection of public spaces with mobility.

Keywords: European identities, fears, hopes, local, mobility, migrations, European citizenship

1. Introduction. Immigration: the first fear of European citizens

Immigration has become the first fear of European citizens, according to the Standard Eurobarometer survey of spring 2015, used in this contribution. In 2015, almost “60 million people forcibly displaced globally and boat crossings of the Mediterranean in the headlines almost daily” (UNHCR, 2015). Thus, immigration is associated with political and ethical challenges and fears, often linked to a sense of shame, of helplessness. The uses of different terms, “migrants” or “refugees” are not neutral but represent a specific dialectic, distilled in the media that use them very often interchangeably. But there is a difference to that matter.

The “migrant” could be defined as “any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country” (UNESCO, 2015). Nevertheless, sometimes, a person can be considered “migrant” even if (s)he was born in the country.

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Therefore, there are some categories of migrants “from within” who are not acknowledged as “national” by others citizens, because of the differences in language, of culture, etc. Even more, some second, third or fourth generation immigrant citizens may not be known *a priori* as “national” by other citizens. The reactions of many people in relation to this “crisis” of migrants differ and particularly depend on contexts and national history. The situation is different in the countries that have experienced waves of immigration, often large, and those who have experienced waves of emigration. The differences are also related to national policies and their effects (Council of Europe, 1995). The fear of Europeans is linked to the arrival of many people from outside the European Union, to the debates on whether “migrants” should be welcome or not and with the media coverage in the different member States.

“Migrants” choose to move for many different reasons (economic, climatic, social, etc.), but they should be able to return back in their country. The situation is different for the people who flee armed conflict or persecution and cannot return home without risking their lives. The international law acknowledges them as “refugees” with a specific status and rights. A civil conflict or a war transforms these migrants into “refugees”, but misery, famine, or persistent drought do not provide this specific status.

One of the Geneva Conventions from 1951, “related to the Status of Refugees” (ratified by 145 UN Member States), provides that the “*term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person [...] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it*” (United Nations, 1951, pp. 1-2).

The distinction between “migrants” and “refugees” is linked to the motivation for leaving the country and also has core consequences. Migrants must follow the countries’ regulations, norms and law, and refugees have rights to protection and asylum defined in international and national law.

Amalgams between refugees and migrants can therefore have serious consequences on the life and safety of persons. At the same time, human rights must be, of course, respected for migrants and refugees must be able to receive an appropriate legal response, but the simultaneity of different movements of population, “migrants” and “refugees”, have not facilitated the explanation of governments’ decisions (OECD, 2015). When several groups are simultaneously trying to cross the borders, Governments often try, at first, to recognize “refugees”, people fleeing war or persecution. Thus, all the others, who move for other reasons, became *de facto* “only” “migrants” (UNHCR, 2015).

Political migrants, economic migrants, climate migrants: do they really choose their destiny? The voluntary aspect is fundamental: the research of a better social position cannot be considered on the same level as the famine, that is, of course, not necessarily a political persecution.

The semantics used to nominate candidates for exile enable us to classify them into at least two categories, even with a stigmatization of situations less dramatic than others. The possible distinction between “migrants” and “refugees” does not seem to be at the centre of political differences that have shaken the European Union since the spring of 2015. The Union is split into East and West, to borrow a quote from the Polish president of the European Council, Donald Tusk. The governments of the Višegrad group, but also of Romania, at the external borders of the Union, want firmness and strict border control, and seem hostile to the reception of refugees and migrants. In September, after the broadcast of a photograph showing a Kurdish 3 year old found dead on a Turkish beach (Damgé and Breteau, 2015), support rallies for asylum seekers have been held in Western Europe. In Central Europe, most anti-migrants gathered in Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava. The governments of these countries have tried to avoid having to enforce mandatory quotas for reception of refugees. Finally, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia continued to oppose to quotas at the end of September. The Višegrad group is now disassociated and Prime Minister Robert Fico said that “Slovakia does not intend to comply with the mandatory quotas. We will lodge a complaint to the court in Luxembourg”, the day after the European Agreement which establishes a distribution of 120,000 “refugees” within the European Union (RT, 2015).

The political risk is particularly important; after a few months of parliamentary elections (February-March 2016), and after Pope Francis called for the prayer of the Angelus, on September 6th, 2015, each parish community was to accommodate a family of refugees: “Faced with the tragedy of tens of thousands of refugees who flee death from war and hunger, and who have begun a journey moved by hope for survival, the Gospel calls us to be “neighbours” of the smallest and the abandoned, and to give them concrete hope”¹. It must be emphasized that this speech concerns both the “victims of war and hunger” and thus the Pope is not involved in the differentiation between migrants and refugees that has been explained before.

So why these differences in perspective, these opposing approaches? In the West, particularly in France, many analysts and commentators criticize the attitude of the countries that have taken advantage of their accession to the European Union, not only in terms of structural funds, but also in terms of freedom of movement. The

¹ Le Monde (2015), Le pape appelle toutes les paroisses d’Europe à accueillir des migrants, retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/06/le-pape-appelle-toutes-les-paroisses-d-europe-a-accueillir-des-migrants_4747411_3214.html.

first country to open its border before the fall of the Berlin Wall, in May 1989, now erects a wall along its border with Serbia and claims a fortress Europe. There would be enough problems internally to not having to deal with “refugees” or “migrants”, moreover non-Christians, who, in any case, are not interested in a stay in the country and who could be the source, by their presence only, of destabilization. So, we encounter two very different arguments; the second is often based on the first. Of course, even if the arguments of the rulers do not necessarily correspond to the opinions of the people, amalgams are quick and easy, especially in the processing of information by the media. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been for a long time dominated by Empires - Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian - before their “return to Europe” after half a century as “satellite” countries of the USSR (Rupnik, 2004). Their populations combine “Europeanness” with Nationality, not in the sense of Nation States, but of peoples, with identity tensions (Bibo, 1986; Ballangé, 2015). As there is a very common confusion between “migrants” and “refugees” and because “fears” often do not distinguish between these two categories, it seems better to use the term “immigrant” in this contribution.

While these countries, except for the Czech Republic, are well within the EU borders, and often under the constraints of the Schengen area, they have the feeling of belonging to a European centrality. Is it a withdrawal on a chauvinistic and limited conception? Their history has left them, generally, outside the great waves of immigration, especially the postcolonial one. Thus, the populations are not used, *de facto*, to a confrontation with different cultures, except for the context of their own emigration.

Early in their European integration, and even now for some of these countries, the migrations, conjugated with a low birth rate and a mortality aggravated by crises and difficulties of transition, have emptied the country. These migrations are not yet to become mobility for all citizens. For example, many Bulgarians still often want to leave their country (Krasteva, 2012; 2014; 2015). In this context, the reception of immigrants is even more difficult to envisage. The countries of Central Europe, in particular, want to change their status, to review their national histories and even to forget their own emigrations (not less than two million Poles have migrated to the UK after the country's accession to the European Union), thus refusing any Europe with two-speed, while the division in terms of economic reality is real, as clearly shown by the analysis of the Standard Eurobarometer 83. The migration of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, in the past or now, is, however, for them, not the same: they are Europeans in Europe, above all, and share *a priori* some cultural invariants. Media coverage of trading on host quotas may suggest that in Eastern Europe, xenophobia and indifference are often the answer to misery, which is contrary to the values currently listed in the Treaty. Obviously, the situation is more nuanced. A lack of cosmopolitan experience is not synonymous with xenophobia.

Political pragmatism is interesting but has its limitations: of course, Europe must show solidarity, but it is perhaps up to western countries, which are

economically better endowed, to find ways to develop this solidarity and to change the Community rules, like it happens now. Indeed, as the vast majority of immigrants only want to pass through the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, what use is maintaining the first host country rule for asylum applications, or attempt to insert immigrants on “the floor of the East European”? In Slovakia, in particular, the question of the reception of immigrants is put into perspective with the situation of Roma people, from a solidarity approach, but also from the perspective of a possible integration. For decades, the resolution of this matter remains unfinished, and therefore, it is necessary to first solve the problems caused by these migrants from within!

This “crisis”, certainly sustainable, raises, perhaps more than that of the Greek economy, the problem of the meaning of the European project, of its values, of exchange. Specifically, the differences between East and West, more than those between North and South (without taking into account those from within the Member States), highlight the difficulty of European cohesion, the deep distortions, the reality, too, of the disenchantment, the rising of fears and hatred.

This contribution is based primarily on the results of the Standard Eurobarometer 83 from spring 2015, which has the merit of being a knowledge base at European level, but with some imperfections and limitations. Other studies provide more comprehensive analysis of this type of source, in particular about the social aspects of the migration crisis in Hungary (Simonovits and Bernat, 2016), about the economic impact of migration (Boettcher and Braeuninger, 2015) or citizen expectations and concerns (Hilmer, 2016). The Eurobarometer is indeed, as the very foundations of the European Union, based on Member States which are statistical units and therefore it is impossible to try to assess the internal variability within national territories.

Nevertheless, the results are fairly stable over time, with the pace of biannual surveys and enable the creation of coherent spaces of public opinion, to show regular trends, particularly on the Europeanisation of mentalities, on the integration of symbols, on the confidence in European institutions, refuge for many, more or less necessary evil for others. The European Union has grown up, perhaps it is now too “adult”, and certainly commonplace. What is unfortunate is that this trivialization seems to happen when the European citizenship remains incomplete (Parisot, 1998).


2. Sharing fears

The Standard Eurobarometer 83 is the second opinion poll carried out across the EU since the inauguration of the Juncker Commission in November, 2014. The survey was conducted in May 2014 during which more than 31 000 respondents were interviewed (in 34 countries). This is the first time since autumn 2010, when the Standard Eurobarometer is structured with this type of questions, and the economic themes are no longer mentioned first: in 20 of the 28 Member

States, immigration is the most cited subject. The current shared fears are, in order: immigration, economy, unemployment, public deficits, terrorism, rising prices (see graph below). The distribution of these fears is however not uniform. For example, Romanians are more afraid of terrorism (28%) and immigration (21%), of which Portuguese are less frightened (16%), as opposed to Germans (55%) and Maltese (65%). This fear is rather installed in the West. Over half of Europeans (51%) have a positive view of immigration from other EU Member States but are reluctant up to 56% to immigration from outside the EU.


Yet, the image of the European Union continues to improve, together with the confidence of European citizens, considering that 40% of respondents (3 percentage points more than in November 2014 and 9 percentage points more since the elections of the European Parliament). This improved level of confidence also extends, on average, to national authorities (31%, with 2 extra points). The Greek crisis, followed by the wave of immigrants changed public opinions, but did not change them radically (though the survey of Eurobarometer 83 was conducted before the new development of the Greek crisis from July 2015). The European citizens are therefore worried, but optimistic about the future of the European Union (58%), whereas 36% of respondents say they are pessimistic.

Figure 1. Fears of European citizens



The first map (Figure 2) shows the distribution of the relative optimism of European citizens (Debomy, 2013). The disparity in results is important: between 1 and 3 out of 4 surveyed have a positive or very positive image of the EU. In the West and in the North, the image is mostly negative except for Luxembourg and Ireland, while in the East, it is mostly positive in Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, but also in Albania and Turkey.

Figure 2. Map from “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a [...] positive [...] image?”



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83, QA9, p. T40

The expectations of Europeans in the economic field remain fairly stable nationally (26% are optimistic about the next twelve months), but nearly half of them (48%) do not expect that the situation will evolve. One in five surveyed remains pessimistic on this point. If the favourable opinions of the euro are stable (57% across the European Union, 69% in the Eurozone), the support for the single currency rose in 14 Member States, particularly in Lithuania (73%), member of the euro area since January 2015, and in Greece (69%).

The most cited positive aspects are: the free movement of people, goods and services, (57% of respondents), as well as the peace among nations (55%). These results seem to highlight a paradox, for if Europeans approve the freedom of movement within the Union, they are worried at the same time, about migration and often condemn the disappearance of physical borders within the Schengen zone. This paradox can be interpreted as a sign of Europeanization of the project, of trivialization, and, thus, a specific withdraw in the space of the European Union. Overall, finally, European citizens adhere to the priority themes set by the Commissioner Juncker, as in November 2014, the majority believe it is necessary to establish a common energy policy within the European Union (72%) and a common immigration policy (73%) and that it would be interesting to use public funds to stimulate private investment (59%).

3. A divided space


The space of our Union is far from unitary, which is obviously not a fault. But above all, the mosaic of peoples that compose it does not seem to share the same logic, the same motivations, and the same representations. Our histories are of course different, we have not shaped our landscapes in the same way, and we do not have the same language, culture, symbols, and myths. Our “great” men and our national narratives are different (Rouet, 2015). These differences are a value, of course, but also, because communication is very segmented, because newspapers can fall back on disconnected public spaces, despite the widespread use of tools with enormous potential, our collective situation is a relative lack of communication, especially between East and West.

The immigrant crises, after that of Greece, are indicators of the differences in perception and analysis, difficulties in understanding and propensities for rapid analysis. For example, a debate on the solidarity within the euro area took place in Slovakia, following the Greek financial crisis. During the debate, representatives tried to assess the respective situations of the two countries and to give meaning to this community fact. The disenchantment and disparities, which remain huge, and the duration of evolution, in particular, are all determinants of positions that are not necessarily nationalistic (Hugo, 2014). The political call that came from the West, ordering the countries of Central Europe to implement an active solidarity, that is to use a part of their already low budget, is not an incentive

to change positions and, above all, places the concerned countries in a secondary partner position.

The space of the European Union is particularly divided by the assessment that Europeans have their own lives. Map no. 2 (Figure 3) shows a Europe of satisfaction levels.

Figure 3. Map from “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied [...] with the life you lead”




Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83, D70, T1

Around Germany, Holland, the UK, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, over 90% of respondents are satisfied, whereas the European regions

that express dissatisfaction are the Portuguese (40%), Albanian (30%), more than 50% of Bulgarians and almost 60% of Greeks. Moreover, these results are far from the stereotypes and prejudices about the alleged tendencies of some people to complain, being based on the practical and real effects of economic developments and certain policies.

The previous graph summarizes a Principal Component Analysis made from 26 variables of Eurobarometer 83 (the complete list of variables can be consulted in annexes).

Figure 4. Mapping. PCA (26 variables)




Source: own representation

The projections of countries demonstrate, quite significantly, the existence of coherent regions within the European Union. In the fourth quadrant, bottom left, unemployment and the financial situation are the major concerns, while in the first quadrant, top left, Romania and Bulgaria clearly express their differentiation between the European situation and the national circumstances, worried in particular by the price and pension levels, but with a good image of the EU. In the third quadrant, countries like Germany, Denmark and Sweden mainly express their satisfaction on the quality of life in their countries, considering that the EU's policy goes in the right sense and that the economic situation in their country is good.

The discrepancy between the views on the EU and on the countries of the respondents is very interesting. The Eurobarometer 83 allows to highlight the distribution of 4 differences in opinions: on judgment of the economic situation (and QA1a.1 QA1a.2, pp. T6-T7), on the quality of life (QA1a. 6 and QA1a.7, pp. T11-T12), on the expectation of a better situation for the next 12 months (QA2a.1 and QA2a.2, pp. T13 and T18) and on the assessment of national or European policy, which would go in the “right direction” (D73a.1 and D73a.2, pp. T28-T29). A PCA performed on the four variables calculated with the differences in opinions regarding the European Union and the country, for each of these themes, leads to a sharp differentiation. The following map shows the distribution of the projection of the countries on the first axis of the PCA.

We clearly find a significant disparity, particularly between three countries, UK, Sweden and Germany, in opposition to the South-eastern Europe, including the latest countries integrated in the EU, and also Serbia and Albania. The differences in opinions within the European Union are thus clearly mapped, and would require more detailed analysis. In the coherence areas, we find both the history of each country within the EU, but also its economic peculiarities. These findings are interesting indicators: the EU division is still important, the expected catching up does not take place at the desired pace, but the countries of the former Soviet space have not moved from a domination to another. Their status has changed: the new members, after having been neighbours and candidates, are now full partners, or at least they should be.

In some countries, the “small country syndrome” seems to dominate: to be able to assert itself, they need to be able to oppose (Balent, 2010). Beyond these divisions, there are some practical issues to highlight, in essence, those concerning the exercise of European democracy.

Figure 5. Map from PCA Judgements about situation (European – National)

Source: own representation

4. The citizens and the European Union

In 2014, the European elections participation rate was slightly higher than in 2009 (Rouet, 2009). However, this tendency of voters to return to the polls is very relative, and the results are very different from one country to another. Beyond the evolution of an individualized society (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Bauman, 2001), this abstention can reveal a political disinterest, which is very questionable and/or reflects a rejection of institutions. But in some countries with high abstention rate, the level of confidence in the European Union and its

institutions is very high. Therefore, and this hypothesis is favoured, citizens seem not to take into consideration the stakes of European elections. In Slovakia, 13% of voters voted in May 2014 to choose their 13 MEPs, while 18.2% in the Czech Republic, and 22.7% in Poland. The abstention rate is lower than 50% in a few countries: Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Malta, Luxembourg and Belgium, where voting is compulsory. This raises at least two fundamental problems: the organization of the European Union on the one hand, and European citizenship, on the other.

The ballot system, as the entire European construction, is based on the Member States, because the members are states before being part of the EU, and indirectly, they represent specific populations. This situation is obviously not such as to engage European citizens to go beyond the national framework (Beck and Giddens, 2006). Election campaigns are organized nationally, such as polls, lists are national, as the vast majority of political parties, and the national framework of the vote does not favour the emergence of a European approach. MEPs are elected by direct suffrage, but their number is regulated for each Member State, which puts into perspective the direct nature of the vote, as the electoral base is not considered globally and integrally.

More generally, this question raises the issue of European citizenship, a citizenship that is based on identity construction (Nowicki, 2005), from principles, values, common actions, but especially by mobilizing the capacity of each Member State citizen to become identified to a representation of the whole community. The belonging, and the feeling of belonging, are central to this approach. Precisely, the Eurobarometer surveys attempt to measure and compare the feelings of belonging to a country, a nation and to the European Union. To the question QD2 "Do you see yourself as..." (Standard Eurobarometer 83, p. T115), respondents can reply: their nationality only, (national) and European, European and (national) European only. The results are interesting with this articulation of the two types of belonging: only 2% consider themselves Europeans and only 6% European and national. The nationality prevails widely, everywhere. The nationality (only) is the response of 38% of respondents, with significant differences between 17% of Luxembourgers and 64% of British citizens. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 47% of Bulgarians consider themselves only national, as 36% of Slovaks and 37% of Hungarians. Germans (25%) and Dutch (26%) cite more their belonging to Europe, but the effect of an accession precedence of States is not systematic.

The involvement of citizens in democracy is crucial for the legitimacy of any community project (Rosanvallon, 2008). Democracy is not a disembodied value. It is possible with its institutions, but becomes concrete in practice, in daily life. The citizenship, national or European, is also related to the feeling of belonging and thus to identity issues which are now the centre of many debates in all countries. But citizenship and identity are a matter for radically different

approaches: we do not build citizenship; we acquire, recognize, and understand it. However, identity is the result of a social process, psychological, cultural and political, scalable and dynamic (Grosser, 1996; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).


Citizenship is entire, in a determined framework and logic, while identity is plural, scalable, linked to cultures and circumstances, to relationships and social representations. For the majority of citizens, it is difficult to pretend not to be European, as it is difficult to convince himself to be only national and to adopt this mood seems to be a political positioning (Andlauer, 2001; Kastoryano, 2005). The used semantic, often for reasons of style rather than as part of a particular intention, perturbs the debate on the confusion between Europe and European Union. It is not Europe, but the European Union which is, if not stalled, at least in trouble because the European identity is difficult to build as part of a Nation-States federation, thus making the community's democracy deficient (Ferry, 2006).

Europe is different and can only be defined by all men and women who feel European, who claim it or not, from Portugal to Latvia, Iceland to Georgia or from Turkey to Norway. The question of European identity then appears very different from that of the will of belonging to an original, economic, social or political union (Carof *et al.*, 2015). The "European citizenship" is also a misnomer because it is citizenship of the European Union (Magnette, 1997). Any EU citizen cannot decide instead of a Turk or a Ukrainian who is or feels to be European or not, cannot decide on the feeling of belonging of anyone. However, he may have an opinion on the interest for himself and for the EU about the integration of another country, more especially when the "European identity", that is the identification with the whole "European Union", is based on values, principles as well as on sharing a story or heritage.

The question needs to be clarified: the question of the integration of Turkey has often faced the problem of this country's belonging to Europe or not (Rouet and Terem, 2011). The confusion continues to be maintained, as there are many different models, several EU projects, -among which, the project of an essentially economic Union-, which do not seem to need a European identity, unless it is seeking to legitimize the project in the frame of a democratic process.

In the Centre and the East, mainly, the project of the European Union could be an economic and cultural federation, with similarities being part of a relative cultural diversity. For these countries, the definition of Europe remains a central issue. In the West, the two aspects are more decoupled: the reluctance vis-à-vis of Turkey is then not due to its belonging or not to Europe but to the evaluation of the benefits, in political or economic terms, of this accession.

It is not to the European Union (nor to the Council of Europe) to define what Europe is or is not and who is European or not, even if the temptation is great, and often considered as legitimate. There are as many *Europes* as Europeans, but a single European Union that can take only one political project, even if this leads to a multipolar and multilevel structure (Girault and Bossuat, 1993).

Figure 6. Map from “You feel you are a citizen of EU”

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83, QD1.1, T112

The actual European Union is trying to evolve into a functioning organism, both more democratic, in the traditional sense, and with more effective governance (Costa and Magnette, 2007). After the great enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, new questions have not been answered yet and, above all, have not been at the centre of democratic debates. In particular, after the mobilization efforts of history, geography, religious heritage, the cement, the legitimization could reside in shared values, which makes us think of the European citizenship, or to the relationships between identities and culture in a context of “cultural diversity” and of multilingualism. But the European people

cannot be found, as, *de facto*, the European public space. At best, public spaces are interconnected (Gura and Styczynska, 2014).

The European citizenship is still incomplete, because it does not include duties, it is automatically granted in a national context (Wihtol de Wenden, 1997). No community authority may give EU citizenship to an applicant: either he is a citizen of a Member State and he already has, *de facto*, the European citizenship, or he is a citizen of a third country, even if he is a legal alien in one of the Member States of the EU, and he may not receive it! This citizenship has no autonomy from the national citizenships of the EU member states and is, ultimately, a sort of complementary status (Rouet, 2011).

The political project to grant European Union citizenship, supranational, to non-EU citizens is not new, but returns to public debates with the “crisis of migrants”. This provision would allow all citizens to become aware about the political reality of the Union, but, above all, to radically change the future of the European Union, currently a federation of sovereign states that do not tell its name.

In 2008, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, MEP at that time, proposed the creation of a European citizenship “disconnected from national citizenship”. As many “political spheres [...] are now decided at European level”, the “citizen is confronted to a political space [...] that] grows up, [...] the European area”. But the difficulty is to “create a European public space, a European public debate. [...] I would like a European citizenship which is not linked to national citizenship” (Roca, 2008).

The Union has evolved and has gradually incorporated for some, confiscated for others, important elements of sovereignty to the states that comprise it: some symbols, a parliament and for a part of the Member States, the removal of border controls and the introduction of a single currency.

The national economic sovereignties are now reduced, numerous constraints are institutionalized and non-normative voluntary agreements contribute to this evolution in areas where, according to the Treaty of the Union, the sovereignty of Member States remains however intact (Cheneval, 2011). This is the case of higher education, for example, with the consequences of the Bologna Process, which also extends far beyond the European Union (Maasen and Olsen, 2007).

The European Union, an ensemble of different political cultures, has all the more need of a political structure based on cooperation and participation, but also on the subsidiarity that enhances effectiveness (or efficiency) and autonomy. But, as this is a framework that was first installed, it is to follow the idea of Bronislaw Geremek “after Europe, we must now make Europeans” (Geremek and Picht, 2007, p. 26). The solidarity and the feeling of belonging do not occur spontaneously.

5. European citizenship and identity(ies)


From the appropriation of this European Union citizenship, complement to the national citizenship, the identity evolution of citizens could lead to competition between national and EU citizenships and, ultimately, perhaps to a reversal of complementarity. Indeed, from the moment when the Union citizenship exceeds the strictly legal framework and is lived on a daily basis, duties could articulate with rights (Chevallier, 2016).

Thus, as identity recognition is an essential foundation of any political power, the change of the scale of the referent, from national to European, could shake the relationships between national and supranational. This possible development does not undermine Nation States, nor does it remove all their sovereignty. The nation-state remains a cornerstone of the necessary democratic legitimacy, while the Union seeks a major policy evolution that would lead to a new appropriation of space by the citizens (Pelinka, 2011). The move towards a Union of citizens does not involve restricting the place of expression of citizenship to national territories (Rostek and Davies, 2006). In this sense, it is possible to conceptualize the evolution of European citizenship, effectively disconnected from national citizenship, and finally true dual citizenship on different political logics, but from similar concepts of citizenship (Lehning, 1999).

Social identity pertains to the position of each in culture and society. Thus, from a psychological and sociological point of view, identification is awareness of differences. This process takes into account the political and ideological issues that induce an identity approach (Camilleri, 1998). The decolonization or the situation of immigrants, young people or inhabitants of suburbs in some countries, have been the object of many studies on the need for identity of people wishing to create their community by displaying their differences (Noiriel, 2007; Dubet, 2002; Juteau, 1999). The evolution of the new institutional environment considerations by each citizen is also a determining factor for the context of identity construction. European citizens cannot only be declared, recognized or designated as such; they must develop a feeling of belonging to the community (Bottici and Challand, 2013).

The identity, just like culture, inherits sharing a tradition of humanism, but also political ethics. The Europeanization of cultures is part of a process of constant openness to the other, an enrichment process that completes the political moral school induced by history and the role of revelation of the European identity that the European institutions should play. However, if numerous texts mention the European identity, it is often a matter of identity of the EEU and not of identity of European citizens, or people who consider that they belong to “Europe”, to their Europe (Hildebrandt and Gutwirth, 2008).

Figure 7. Map from “What is your opinion [...] are you for [...] further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years?”



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83, QA18.3, T72

In 2004, a rather heated debate was relayed by many media throughout the EU, when a dozen of European countries asked that the preamble of the European Treaty in discussion should contain a reference to the “Christian roots” of Europe (Topic and Sremac, 2014). The oppositions were then radical, obviously not related to a definition of citizenship of the EU, but to a particular conception of European identity. This was perhaps one of the first debates of this kind that become public, but whose issues ultimately were quickly diverted with the media coverage of Turkey’s candidacy. The question of European identity has exceeded that of the

identification of the European federation (Duchesne, 2008), it was no longer to know what our Union was, but what we were, as a whole. Hence the debate is on: the limits of enlargement, the practice of solidarity, the reception of immigrants, etc.

The division of Europe, on this issue of enlargement, is very interesting: people near EU borders are rather favourable, while those in the “centre” are reserved. The “crisis of migrants” has highlighted this point: it is not at all “comfortable” to have to manage a community frontier in the current context. Therefore, it would be, in absolute and theoretically, interesting to push a little further these boundaries that must be managed. It is a shifting of the problem, of course, but also a response to a dramatic reality, which is uncomfortable.

6. The future of the European Union and of its citizenship

Thus, European citizenship exists, but it is unfinished, incomplete. An impossible quest, as Gerard Bossuat writes, of “low emotional intensity and strong conceptual complexity because the European public space does not exist enough for European citizens to stage their will to live together”² (Bossuat, 2001, p. 283). Fourteen years later, this European public space exists “more”, but how does it exist?

Then, can the EU citizens be satisfied with a flag, an anthem and, for the majority of them, a single currency? All this seems to be insufficient for an active identification. In addition, citizens cannot translate their hopes in the project because of the political structure, with representatives who are elected on a national basis, with roles and names that confuse their understanding: the European ministers are Commissioners and the Laws are Directives.

Yet, the connection between European identity and European citizenship is not unilateral: the European identity is purposely built by a citizen movement and the exercise of citizenship is based on an identitary construction process, unless we stay at the administrative level and at the civil status (Chrysoschoou, 2009). By reinforcing the institutions and by setting up new structures, new processes, it could be possible to incite people to adopt a new position, in a process of identification, but this requires that a project logic accompanies the setting of new rights and the gradual acceptance of duties for the development of a real European public-spiritedness. And, above all, a shared project, specific confrontations and communication: we must go further, to the East, to be able to consider public opinion in the West, and *vice versa*. Nowadays, there are tools which are and will further be used to express democracy across the EU.

² “En fait, l’identité européenne est une réalité de faible intensité affective et de forte complexité conceptuelle parce que l’espace public européen n’existe pas assez pour que les citoyens européens puissent mettre en scène leur volonté de vivre ensemble” (traduction by author).

The basis of all political action belongs to the citizen who must legitimize the policy and the use of public funds not only by voting but also by being an actor, notably by using the means at its disposal to organize its expression. Participation in the elections is obviously an indicator of the involvement of citizens in institutions and in large collective debates, but in the case of European elections, abstention does not necessarily illustrate a lack of interest or of disaffection (Perrineau, 2003). The level of awareness of the issues is crucial to mobilize voters. The vote, as organized, is not an exclusive indicator of “citizenship”. This vote can even be considered as superfluous, useless, without interest, within populations globally acquired to the project of EU.

The “return to Europe” of Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, takes the form of a political, economic and partly social and cultural integration, little passionate, almost “obvious”. The Union membership is thus not only a political alliance act, but also an identitary event.

On another level, the vote is obviously necessary for the Union to be legitimized politically and under the current conditions of European elections organization, we must first bring the Union closer to its citizens. Many community cooperation programs tend towards that goal but, at best, lead to the establishment of relations between European citizens and the Commission and its Directorates-General, and few, on a daily basis, between Parliament and voters. The legitimacy of the European project remains a long-term process of abstract principles achievement. It may be necessary to practice the “deepening” advocated by some Member States governments that, after a “pause” in the enlargement, is now installed, perhaps permanently. Citizens should take the time to build, for themselves, a political, social and cultural representation of the European Union that is and is not Europe, at the same time.

Often, the electorates remember only a general architecture, far from a recognized democratic model, and think, also, that they are not informed enough on the evolution of the competencies and the balance between Parliament and the Commission (as, in the society of screens and information, everyone seems to be under-informed). Thus, information, communication and training would be a priority, as European citizenship cannot be built spontaneously, and is badly reflected in the mirror of the European elections, in particular (Boismenu and Petit, 2008). If this image does not please some, it is because the mirror is frosted and not because voters are indifferent, unconscious or disillusioned.

The European Union is both united in “diversity” and in its contrasts, its contradictions, oppositions and its conflicts, from North to South and from East to West. How, with this disaffection for politics, this apparent lack of legitimacy, this incommunicability (Wolton, 2014) between East and West, respond and integrate antagonisms and nationalistic withdrawals that are expressed in the East, as in the West? (Nowicki, 2010).

The European integration can follow several scenarios and since the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, in particular, many imagine or anticipate an exceeding of the States by the local (i.e. regions) as from above (the European Union), with a configuration that is based on the multipolar EU for the establishment of macro-regions, which implies then to “erase” the old Nation States inherited from previous centuries.

But it seems that this often expected disappearance of Nation-States (Paquet, 2002) is now difficult to orchestrate, at least in the medium term. That, however, does not contradict the thesis defended by Jürgen Habermas (1992)³: A European public space can quite impose itself in a community framework where nation states remain strong, provided, *inter alia*, further development of cross-border projects and interconnection of civil society organizations. The changing of expectations, the rise of social networks and the social mutation within the information society contribute to the transformation of local, national, public spaces, without waiting journalists. This transformation of a new space without borders turns constraints into opportunities, with a commitment that gives hope that, whatever the evolution of our European construction, the citizen, irrespective of whether he considers it necessary to vote for the European Parliament or not, will be able to participate in the community life, in the exchange and the sharing, and thus to build our political Europe in peace, progress and respect for everyone.


Map no. 6 (Figure 8) shows a division similar to that of the previous maps. In a way, it represents a milder relativization of the disenchantment. Even if in Bulgaria or Romania, the opinions on the current situation are negative, there is still hope: 28% of Bulgarians and 32% of Romanians believe that their children's lives will be more difficult than theirs, while 70% of Belgians, 63% of French and 69% of Luxembourgers have that opinion. The feeling of having reached a comfort, or the highest possible level of satisfaction, in a way, dominates Western Europe, while for others, some progress is needed: the disenchantment is not the same, for them or for the future. This map is also a sort of self-projection of the belief in progress, in an expected and hoped “catching up”, on one side, and in fear of the future, in a relative pragmatism linked to a social situation dominated by an individualism each of which knows the boundaries, on the other side. A divided Europe, again.

The Nations are not the States and it is no longer an opposition between an artificial vision of Nation-States, and a vision (especially cultural) of Nations in Empires (Tétard, 2009). But even today, the cultural cooperation arrangements, the influence diplomacy continue to be based on a constitutional architecture of

³ Jürgen Habermas puts into perspective the disappearance of the nation state and the development of European civil society, enabling him to foresee a shift towards a deliberative democratic system in which the “constitutional patriotism” would be supported by the political identity European public space, distinct of cultural identity.

States, including those within the European Union and even though a large part of sovereignty is now pooled, and if the Europe of the regions, in particular, became, de facto, one of the political, cultural and social realities of the European Union.

Figure 8. Map from “Generally speaking, do you think that the life of those in the EU who are children today will be [...] more difficult [...] as the life of those from your own generation?”



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83, QD8, p. T130

The Romanians, as the Bulgarians, aspire to join the Schengen area. Let us ask ourselves why, trying to put aside the issue of immigrants. We must not forget the symbolic. What seems trivial to some might not be the same for others. Young

or old French, if they wish, if they are encouraged to, if they plan to, can take a car and travel from Portugal to Finland freely, without being aware that they pass through some frontiers. These frontiers are now only symbolic, because physical borders no longer exist (Rouet, 2013). For Romanians and Bulgarians, citizens that joined the EU in 2007, Europe remains abstract, sometimes idealized, while accession to Schengen is as important as the integration in the Euro area was for many Estonians in 2011, even as the debate on the crisis and the possible exit of Greece from the euro zone was then in much of the European media.

The Schengen accession is part of the evolution of mobility practices. This mobility is essential for the European construction, it does not necessarily need to be long, but it should be selected, interpreted, experienced. The mobility mobilizes the affect, the relational. They are also of the order of desire.

7. Conclusion. Mobile citizens

Attitudes change and shared fears could be better conjured.

More and more young Europeans become mobile while maintaining a local rooting (Wallon, 2000, p. 378). The boundaries are transcended symbolically and materially. For many students from Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Europe has become very small, the youth of these countries “move” a lot, they are incited to move. The Erasmus + program is no longer only targeted at the students and staff of higher education institutions, and positive evolution is shown with the expanding of the base of beneficiaries. But we must also connect the intellectual and physical mobility from the beginning of schooling. Every teacher, every parent has a role to play. The European area is a space of exchange, and the projects of each converge to collective projects. The mobility should not however be compared to migration, because beyond the effects and consequences, the attitude, the position are different. One must ask how the Slovaks have become mobile, they go for work in the West, for certain periods of time, and when they stay some months or years, they still maintain their “Slovaquity”.

Here is a way to approach the “Europeanity” by this relationship to space and time (Nowicki, 1999). But by this trivialization of the European construction (Bulmer and Paterson, 1987, p. 122), this space, precisely, is not a dream or paradise for European citizens anymore. And the trivialization strengthens the project, as it participates in the evolution of mobile citizens who become European citizens, or perhaps those European citizens become mobile citizens?

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Annexes

Standard Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015, “Public Opinion in the European Union”, list of questions used in the contribution.

D70, “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied [...] with the life you lead”, p. T1

C2, Political interest index (Strong + Medium) p. T5

QA1a.1 “How could you judge the current situation [...] of the (Nationality) economy” (very good + rather good), p. T6

QA1a.2 “How could you judge the current situation [...] of the European economy” (very good + rather good), p. T7

QA1a.6 “How could you judge the current situation [...] of the quality of life in (our country)” (very good + rather good), p. T11

QA1a.7 “How could you judge the current situation [...] of the quality of life in the EU” (very good + rather good), p. T12

QA2a.1 “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better [...] when it comes to your life in general?”, p. T13

QA2a.6 “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better [...] the economic situation of EU?”, p. T18

QA34 “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment”, Unemployment, p. T20

QA34 “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment”, Immigration, p. T20

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, the economic situation in our country, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, rising prices/inflation/cost of living, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, taxation, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, Unemployment, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, the financial situation of your household, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, health and social security, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, the education system, p. T21

QA4a “And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing à the moment?”, pensions, p. T21

QA34 “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment”, Unemployment, p. T24

QA34 “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment”, Immigration, p. T25

D73a.1 “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction [...] in?” (our country), p. T28

D73a.2 “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction [...] in?” the European Union, p. T29

QA9 “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a [...] positive [...] image?, p. T40

QA18.3 “What is your opinion [...] are you for [...] further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years?, p. T72

QD1.1 “You feel you are a citizen of EU”, p. T112

QD8 “Generally speaking, do you think that the life of those in the EU who are children today will be [...] more difficult [...] as the life of those from your own generation?”, p. T130.