The United States and the European Community, 1969-1974: an uneasy partnership

Thi Thuy Hang NGUYEN*

Abstract

The relations between the United States and the European Community under the Nixon Administration (1969-1974) were considerably changing. Post-1945 cooperation and dependence increasingly gave way to economic competition and division in military and foreign policies. Yet, the United States and the European Community knew that they were strategically important to each other, thus they had to continue cooperation and coordination to defend and advance their economic and strategic interests.

With a documentary research approach, this paper aims to examine how the United States and the European Community their partnership evolved between 1969 and 1974. It explores the ties that the Nixon Administration designed to bind the European Community and the European Community's responses. It also puts forth that despite their efforts to continue cooperation; the relations between the United States and the European Community were on a downward course. It will be concluded that the United States and the European Community experienced a difficult time in their relations between 1969 and 1974, but both sides showed certain efforts to maintain the partnership.

Keywords: The United States, the European Community, the Nixon Administration, European integration, NATO, Atlantic alliance

1. Introduction

The relationship between the United States and the European Community underwent significant changes during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Post-1945 cooperation and dependence increasingly gave way to economic competition and division in military and foreign policies. Yet, the leaders of both sides understood that they needed each other, thus they sought to enhance cooperation and coordination to defend and advance their economic and strategic interests.

* Thi Thuy Hang Nguyen is a PhD candidate at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; email: s334642@student.rmit.edu.au.

This paper aims to examine how partnership between the United States and the European Community evolved between 1969 and 1974. It explores the ties that the Nixon Administration used to bind the European Community and the European Community's responses to those ties. It also points out that despite their efforts to coexist; the relations between the United States and the European Community were on a downward course. It will be concluded that the United States and the European Community were strategically important to each other, thus partnership, though uneasy, had to be maintained.

2. Uncomfortable cooperation

The new developments in United States – European Community relations between 1969 and 1974 came at a time when Washington found itself having to adjust to fundamental new realities. The world was undergoing profound change. The Nixon Administration's biggest concern was U.S. relative loss of power. President Nixon was nervously wondering whether the United States continued to be a great nation (Haldeman, 1994, p. 344). The change in the international political situation and the limit of U.S. power made the Nixon Administration to signal to the European Community that the United States wanted to limit the country's obligations in Europe. This implied that the Europeans had to do more to defend themselves physically and could not easily penetrate into U.S. massive market.

Though the United States had strained relations with the European Community during the Nixon years, it had no alternative to a policy of cooperation. It had become imperative for both the Americans and the Western Europeans to cooperate to overcome the challenges facing the two sides. The United States needed to have the European allies to contain the Soviet communism while the European Community needed to have the Americans to increase its security (Lieber, 1967, p. 52; Lieber, 1979, pp. 531-545; Lieber, 1980, pp. 139-163). Furthermore, the economic link between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean was closed, the United States and the European Community were well aware that they needed each other to advance their prosperity. Hence, they chose to live with each other although they did not feel comfortable.

3. The ties that bound

In the Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, it clearly indicated that the relationship between the United States and the European Community was in transition. It suggested a probable U.S. - European trade-off, in which the United States gave assurances in the security field while the European Community helped to alleviate U.S. economic problems. The Memorandum stressed that Western Europe's integration was greatest in the economic sphere,

where U.S. interests were most often challenged, and least in the political and military area, where U.S. interests would best be served by the integration process. The unevenness of development in these two spheres led to ambivalence in U.S. approach to the European integration project.

The stresses on US - European economic and commercial issues intensified tendencies on the Nixon Administration to take a narrower position, which undermined cooperation and cooperative arrangements in other fields. The United States viewed that the comprehensive relationship with the European Community had to be brought into a balance more favourable to the United States. The Nixon Administration was unable to pursue separate tracks in security, political and economic policies. It was necessary for the United States to have cohesion in making its policies and coherence in implementing them.

With this view, President Nixon concluded that a set of principles governing U.S. relationship with Atlantic partners had to be prepared. These principles had to be designed to serve as the foundation for U.S. relations with the European Community. The Nixon Administration aimed to tie the European Community to the common principles of the Atlantic alliance. Thus, President Nixon wanted to (i) develop a comprehensive framework within which the members of the Alliance will be in the pursuit of their economic, political, and security goals; (ii) form a foundation for a new consensus on Alliance security requirements; (iii) show continuing support for European integration; (iv) indicate support for the development of economic ties between the United States and the European Community, (v) maintain U.S. security commitments in Western Europe (National Security Study Memorandum 183).

With this set of principles, the Nixon Administration looked forward to major progress in the United States and the European Community relationship. In his Memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger expressed his satisfaction to the United Kingdom's sympathy: "The British leaders are in strong sympathy with your initiative and are gearing up to support you in the effort to establish a new set of guidelines for Atlantic relations that would have significant political appeal on both sides of the ocean and would help override the tendency to haggle about technical issues" (Kissinger, 1973). These guidelines would cover all aspects of United States – European Community relations. The Nixon Administration aimed to set up a period of genuine creativity in adapting United States – European Community relationship to new conditions and setting the United States and the European Community on a course that would be difficult to reverse by successive governments in both the United States and the European Community (National Security Study Memorandum 183).

The Nixon Administration held that the European Community in the 1970s was transforming and evolving to cohesion and greater assertion of independence from the United States on fundamental policy issues. All major countries in the European Community were aware of the basic polio-economic and diplomatic

interests that they shared with each other but not with the United States. Yet, these countries could not ignore the Soviet threat with which they were certainly unable to handle without Washington's cooperation. The Nixon Administration knew that the European Community member states were seeking to figure out the compromises, new institutional arrangements and defence measures which gave them feasible options for eventually standing up to their protector, the United States, as full equals. What concerned the Nixon Administration most in relations with the European Community was how to obtain European support for U.S. foreign policy goals and prevented this Community from implementing a dependent and unfriendly policy towards Washington. Thus, President Nixon had to design a new configuration of the U.S. relationship with the European Community.

In political realm, the Nixon Administration was concerned about European political integration. Though the United States' formal stance was promoting European political unity, whether or not in framework of an Atlantic alliance, the Nixon Administration in fact preferred to see this European political integration process taking place in U.S. interests on economic and foreign policy.

In military realm, the Nixon Administration believed that the U.S. nuclear force and European-based U.S. ground and air forces were crucial elements for confronting the Soviet threat. The lack of nuclear muscles made the European Community bound to Washington on a wide range of political, military, and security issues.

In economic realm, the Nixon Administration knew that the European Community had interest in developing the non-Communist portion of the world's economy. The U.S. unilateral action to end the Bretton Wood system on August 15, 1971 taught the Western Europeans a lesson on how the European Community's economy was interweaving with U.S. economy. The U.S. decision to implement a new economic policy on August 15, 1971 brought home to the Western Europeans the serious consequences of competing with the United States and the manifold issues on trade and financial policies. The Nixon Administration knew this weakness of the European Community's economy and thus great efforts were directed by Washington to use Western Europe's dependence on Washington as leverage to reap benefits in the economic area.

In addition to these ties designed to bind the European Community, the Nixon Administration acknowledged that the United States was also naturally so closed to Western European. It was bound to Western Europe by the strategic interests it was pursuing. In its re-evaluation of the United States – European Community relations, the Nixon Administration stressed that the structure of U.S. relations with Western Europe was challenged by a series of developments namely strategic parity, détente, economic problems and the European Community enlargement from six to nine. It also underlined U.S. interests in sustaining relationship with Western Europe. They included (i) preventing the Soviet control

or influence from extending westward; (ii) encouraging and supporting Western European prosperity and stability to enhance the Allied ability to resist Soviet aggression; (iii) preventing a re-emerge of European hostilities and conflicts, towards this end, supporting European integration; and (iv) ensure great U.S. influence on the policies of the countries in the European Community (Document 38, FRUS 1969-1976).

Especially, the Nixon Administration asserted that in an increasingly fluid international system, the United States had another interest in Western Europe: the United States had been so closely committed to Western Europe for a long time that any serious decline of U.S. position and leadership in Western Europe would negatively affect U.S. diplomatic and strategic standing in the global balance. With these five major interests in Western Europe, the Nixon Administration considered six alternative frameworks to be envisaged for U.S. relations with the European Community.

- *Atlantic Alliance*. Pragmatic adaptation of the existing Atlantic system to mitigate, if not resolve, its political-military and political-economic problems, and acceptance of the limitations of working within the system to influence Western European policies outside of the traditional scope of the Alliance.
- *Closer Atlantic Ties*. Extension of Alliance coordination functionally and/or geographically.
- *US Hegemony*. Hard bargaining of the US security commitment to Europe against Western European concessions to the US on economic and other issues, and undermining the unity of the Nine by playing them off against each other.
- *Devolution*. Phased transfer of part of the US security burden to the Allies.
- *Diminution*. Unilateral cutback of US force levels, while retaining basic US commitments to Western European security.
- *Disengagement.* US withdrawal of its military presence in Europe, perhaps even of its treaty commitment, and dealing with Western European states on an ad hoc basis without fixed, prior commitments (Ibid).

Having carefully analysed these options in terms of their feasibility and their influence on U.S. security, hegemony and costs, the following main conclusions were drawn by the Nixon Administration:

- The costs in terms of security and influence of the two alternatives of diminution of the US role or of disengagement are too great, and the feasibility of the third, hegemony, is too slight to pursue them as realistic courses.
- The policy most likely to meet our needs would include these elements of the other three options:

a) Adapt the existing Atlantic system by working to solve its specific political-security and political-economic problems.

b) Add to the existing system more intensified consultations with the Allies.

c) The possibilities of devolution should be urgently studied with the aim of arriving at a definite decision whether the US wishes i) to promote devolution, ii) to be receptive to European proposals to that end if any are ever made, or iii) to resist such a development (ibid).

In a nutshell, the Nixon Administration realised that the Alliance system was going to offer the best vehicle available for U.S. pursuit of its national interests in common with the European Community. Though the Alliance system was not perfect, it could be improved by adaptation to ensure that it would be functioning consistently with U.S. interests and the new international environment. The Nixon Administration's conclusions in framing U.S. relationship with the European Community illustrated that President Nixon and his team were fully conscious of how the United States was bound to the European Community. The close interlink between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean was the basis for them to formulate and implement foreign policies to each other. The Americans and the Western Europeans had to depend on each other to achieve their strategic objectives. They were not satisfied with each other's policies and stance but they knew that they had to make certain concessions to coexist in the fluid international environment.

4. The European Community's responses

In his address on November 24, 1969 to the Agricultural Committee of the Chambers of Commerce of Minneapolis and St. Paul and the USDA (The United States Department of Agriculture) Club of the Twin Cities, Mr. Pierre S. Malve, Representative for Trade Affairs Liaison, Office of the Commission of the European Community in Washington, affirmed: "[…] the United States and the Community must cooperate" (Commission of European Communities, 1970). He added: "The bilateral contacts which tend to develop between politicians and officials in the United States and the Community should improve their understanding of each other's different situations and points of view" (Ibid). Though the European Community was frustrated with the Nixon Administration's foreign policy; they had to accept the fact that they could not look inward and they needed U.S. military umbrella for their European integration project. This was indicated by Kissinger in 1968: "Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defence efforts of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied, and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States" (Strömvik, 2005).

The European Community knew that cooperation with the United States was crucial to its development. Economic and commercial relations with the United States were causing concern to the Western Europeans. They supposed that fairly profound misconceptions were current in Washington which had been

trying to evaluate the results so far achieved by the U.S. policy of supporting European integration and to estimate its impact on economic relations between both sides of the Atlantic. According to the European Community, such misconceptions led to the tensions between the Americans and the Europeans. The Europeans even showed certain facts to correct these misconceptions. In February 1970, the European Community published a review of economic and trade relations between the United States and the Community in which ten main arguments were underlined to prove that the European Community had been seeking to be a good partner of the United States (Commission of European Communities, 1970).

First, particular attention had to be paid to the way economic relationship between the United States and the European Community was developing. In general, the European Community had been giving favourable conditions to this economic development. It, the Western Europeans held, compared very favourably not only with the trend of relations between the United States and other parts of the world but also with developments in the period prior to the establishment of the Community (Ibid).

Second, along with the confirmation of considerable growth of U.S. exports to the European Community, the review illustrated that the European Community lowered its tariff levels to create a favourable condition for international trade. This implied that the European Community was not inward-looking as the United States criticised. Furthermore, it pointed out that the establishment of the European Community's common customs had given an impetus towards a liberal trade policy in the world. Following a series of tariff reductions, the European Community had the lowest tariff among the leading developed countries (ibid).

Third, the European Community was denying that it systematically replaced its tariff barriers by non-tariff barriers (ibid).

Fourth, the European Community indicated that a larger number of U.S. firms had found opportunities to expand their activities in the Community. It asserted that the U.S. economy gaining profits from European integration, from a substantial growth in trade between the United States and the European Community and from the a considerable increase in income from investments in the European Community which was contributed significantly to improving the balance of payments in the United States (ibid).

Fifth, the European Community stressed that it was not implementing a protectionist approach in economic and trade relations with the United States. The European Community was the world's largest importer from both developed and developing countries and it had a higher foreign trade growth rate than that of the other industrialised countries. With such dependence on the world trade, it was in the European Community's interest not to be inward-looking (ibid).

Sixth, regarding its tariff preferences for the developing countries, the European Community underlined that it was its responsibility as a leading

importer in the world to support the establishment of tariff preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures exported by the developing countries, a responsibility agreed at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964.The Community's tariff preferences would enable the developing countries to overcome their competitive disadvantages in their products (ibid).

Seventh, concerning U.S. criticism for the European Community's agricultural policies, the European Community argued that any in-depth analysis needed to include both a product-by-product examination and a look at the general tendencies. The European Community had tried to bring the surpluses in some sectors, particularly milk and milk products under control and structural reforms in its agricultural area were inevitable. While the European Community confirmed that the growth of government expenditure on agriculture was common to every country, it indicated that the European Community remained the most important importer of U.S. agricultural products (ibid).

Eighth, the European Community realised that the international market for agricultural products was more often the scene of price wars between public treasuries than competitions between producers. Thus, it called for greater disciplines on wor1d agricultural markets (ibid).

Ninth, the European Community complained about U.S. measures to protect its agriculture which were affecting the Community. Furthermore, that Washington abandoned the broadly liberal policy pursued by the United States since the end of the Second World War and returned to restrictive practices would lead to the beginning of a chain reaction detrimental to the development of the world trade (ibid).

Last but not least, it was reaffirmed that cooperation between the United States and the European Community was a necessity for the future expansion of the international economic relations. Close cooperation between the European Community and the United States would ensure the continuity of the liberal trade policy which made a considerable contribution to promoting world trade and thus expanding prosperity all over the world (ibid).

From the main points in this review, it can be said that the European Community understood that the Western Europeans had to sustain U.S. interest in international affairs in order to maintain the Community's welfare and security. The European Community had to show that an economically strong and united European Community would not create awkward cases of competition for the United States. Thus, following U.S. complaints about Western European hurtful economic confrontation and uncooperative foreign policy in the Middle East crisis and oil crisis, the European Community had showed that it had been seeking to solve its own internal problems and fulfil its regional and global responsibilities. It also indicated its willingness to cooperate with the United States for the common good of the alliance. The European Community acknowledged that its

internal integration process was only achieved with U.S. supports, thus it had not resisted U.S. authority in the world affairs. In other words, the European Community wanted to show that the European Community and the United States could cooperate for their common good and avoid confrontations which might hurt both sides.

This viewpoint was clearly stated in the address entitled "New opportunities or challenges in the European Communities" by Guy Vanhaeverbeke, Deputy Director of European Communities Information Service in Washington at the twenty-third annual Virginia conference on world trade*:* "Europeans realized today that it will not be possible for them to define their relations towards each other without also defining their relations towards the rest of the world" (*Guy Vanhaeverbeke, 1971).* He also outlined two challenges facing the European Community: (i) "Construction of European unity must continue internally to progress in all the economic and political areas" (Ibid). Implicitly, the Europeans knew that further progress in economic integration was dependent on the progress in monetary field. Also, monetary progress was associated with progress in political unity which could be achieved without a minimum of consensus on questions of defence; (ii) The European Community desired to make sure that European integration resulted in a positive contribution to trade with the industrialised countries, economic and political take-off of developing countries and to a détente with the Eastern bloc (ibid).

To sum up, the European Community's responses showed that the European Community had no intention to become rivals to the United States. The Western Europeans acknowledged that the close political and commercial relations between the two shores of the Atlantic were important for the prosperity of both world trade and standards of living for all nations (Commission of European Communities, 1972).

The relationship between the United States and the European Community was at a turning point in the sense that they had to be adapted to a totally new environment resulting either from changes taking place in the international community, or from the tendencies and characteristics of their own developments. Yet, the European Community maintained that it would be unfavourable for the future of United States – European Community relationship if the European Community was so preoccupied with achieving successfully its enlargement goal and reluctant to assume its global responsibilities. Also, the European Community held that it would be disappointing if the United States, which was defining its new world strategy and concerned about its internal political and economic activities, was preoccupied only by its own national interests in the formulation of a foreign economic policy. Being alarmed by the fact that the climate of economic and trade relations between the United States and Europe had been deteriorating, the European Community stressed that it was necessary to search constantly for

favourable grounds and effective instruments for a new cooperation. Such an attempt required efforts from both sides.

5. The United States - European Community relations: a downward course

That the Nixon Administration reconsidered the traditional policy of U.S. supports for European integration in light of the political and economic difficulties was, Devuyst asserted, "detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations" (Devuyst, 2007, p.9). The Nixon Administration was accused of forming its policy on self-interest, largely for domestic reasons and thus ignoring the wider demands of the European unity (Smith, 1978, p.9). U.S. economic concerns and new foreign policy priorities made the Nixon Administration to conduct policies which challenged the European Community's economic and security concerns (Devuyst, 2007, p.9). This led to friction between the European Community and the United States over foreign policy. To give one example, tensions occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when Washington was supportive of Israel and many European countries were hesitant. Understandably, the European Community depended upon the oil supply from Middle East more than the United States did.

As noted by Kaiser in 1974, no Atlantic solidarity would erase the fact that Western Europe heavily depended on Arab oil and could not survive without it while the United States was able to do without it with some difficulty at present and with less difficulty (Kaiser, 1974, p. 278). In addition, the core states of Western Europe, France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany had strong economic relations with the Arab countries. Because the war and the energy question were closely linked with both security and economic prosperity, Western European policy stance in the Middle East was to call on Israel to withdraw from Arab lands occupied in 1967. Western Europe urged the United States, the only nation that could place the leverage on Israel, to press the Israelis to reach a settlement with her neighbours. However, Nixon and Kissinger saw the conflict was an extension of the Cold War and "was angered at the attempts of the Europeans to negotiate a diplomatic *modus vivendi* with the Arab oil-producing states" (Palmer, 1988, p. 65). The United States strongly criticised Western Europe's refusal to assist Israel in the 1973 war, which resulted in the OPEC oil embargo.

U.S.-European differences regarding to political and economic issue-areas led to the fact that the European Community started to develop more complicated processes of cooperation with the goals to resist pressures to fall in line with U.S. expectations. The Declaration on European Identity (1973), signed in Copenhagen by the nine member states, was considered to be the first step towards a tentative common European foreign policy. It called on the members of the European Community to make the best use of the instrument of European Political Cooperation created in 1970, to guarantee that foreign policy would be

coordinated among member states. In other words, the European Community realized the strength of a collective voice in the relations with the United States. Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration still preferred bilateral relations with Western European states because Nixon and Kissinger saw the potential challenge to the United States when Western Europe exerted its collective assertiveness in political and economic issues.

The United States persuaded Western Europe to agree to a clause in the new Atlantic Declaration, signed in June 1974, stipulating that Washington would be consulted before the European Community made any significant decisions which could have influence on transatlantic issues. In practice, however, allied relations remained strained. Western Europe's confidence in the United States was shaken when enthusiasm among U.S. policy-makers for European economic and political integration appeared to wane. Nixon's political and economic policies had such a bad effect on transatlantic relations that this period was referred to as a dark age in the history of the diplomatic ties between the United States and Western Europe: "The age of U.S. patience and benevolence with regard to European integration and European economic competition had come to an abrupt end" (Larres, 2009, p. 161). Indeed, as Smith points out, in the Nixon Administration the Atlantic Alliance was experienced a period of disengagement and drift, "one in which some of the illusions of the previous twenty years were to be shattered" (Smith, 1988, p. 16). Transatlantic relations became increasingly difficult, and this included relations within NATO.

On the one hand, Western Europe had recorded great achievements in economic growth and was in the midst of the long journey towards deeper integration. With the United States assistance and enormous efforts made by the governments of Western Europe, the region was reconstructed and became self-sufficient. In spite of having successfully built an economic powerbase, one area where Western Europe still relied on the United States was in the matter of security. One the other hand, the United States' relative economic decline, in combination with détente with the Soviet Union and China and the accompanying perception of receding military threat from the Warsaw Pact definitively contributed to undermining the Nixon Administration's commitments to the European continent and, to some extent, to NATO. The Nixon Administration, therefore, became increasingly sceptical about the benefits of America's overriding contribution in NATO. In other words, the problem of burden-sharing emerged in the relations among the United States and other countries in NATO.

Nixon and Kissinger believed that in order to get Western Europe to contribute more to the budget of NATO, two conditions needed to be met: Western Europe had to "develop its own perception of international relations" and Western Europe had to aware that the United States could not "pick up the tab alone any longer" (Kissinger, 1979, p. 86).

According to historian Kenneth Weisbrode, Nixon and Kissinger saw the importance of the alliance and they believed it to be indeed essential, however "only as leverage against the Soviets and to keep the Europeans compliant" (Weisbrode, 2009, p. 210).Western European leaders did see the value of the Alliance as "the last measure of the U.S. strategic commitment to Western Europe" and they did worry about the possibility that the United States might withdraw troops from the region in reaction to domestic issues (Hahn, 1972). Since the inception of NATO, the United States kept contributing more than their fair share of the NATO budget and thus dominated the organization. President Nixon, in many of his speeches, talked about schedules on changing that situation. The Allies would do their fair share of the burden and in return they could have a bigger say within the alliance. However, Western Europe showed their unwillingness to share the burden on the United States' shoulder.

On February 23, 1969 Nixon made a wide sweeping trip to Western Europe. The Belgian leaders shared with the Nixon Administration the view that in order for détente to take place, NATO had to be strong; however, they also informed Nixon about the minimal possibility of an increase in Belgium's defence efforts in NATO. In Kissinger's words, the Belgians "pleaded for a continued substantial U.S. troop presence in Europe" (Kissinger, 1979, p. 80). On February 24, 1969 President Nixon made a speech in front of the North Atlantic Council and underlined that with the appropriate preparation the United States was willing to have negotiations with the Europeans on various issues and the United States also tried to enhance the alliance. It was noticeable that all the ambassadors present at the meeting stayed away from the issue of the European nations increasing their military effort for the organization while at the same time agreeing on the need for U.S. high presence on the continent. Explicitly, Western Europe was not prepared and unwilling to increase their burden sharing as the United States expected.

The burden-sharing issue became pressing in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Nixon Administration perceived of U.S. relative economic decline. Washington planned to look after its economic and political interests much more than before. It was no longer willing to accept unilateral disadvantages in the hope of achieving vaguely defined benefits in the long run. The economic and social challenges faced by the United States in the Nixon era led to the fact the United States pressed the European member states of NATO harder on burden-sharing. Seemingly, the United States wanted to disengage from Western Europe and focus more attention on domestic issues. The United States considered reducing its military presence abroad as one of the solutions to the problem of the balance of payments and to the unfair burden sharing pattern in NATO. Yet, Western Europe did not want to sacrifice their socio-economic achievements in order to be able to narrow the huge capability gap existing between the continent and the United

States. As a consequence, the burden-sharing dispute between the United States and Western Europe emerged and made the alliance strained.

> Kissinger's proposal [for an equal share of military burden] [...] was destined to exert a profound influence on Western Political thinking, even though doomed to fall short of detailed implementation. At bottom it seemed to involve another application of the celebrated Nixon-Kissinger theory of "linkage" whereby any connections made by one party in one area should be matched by other concessions made by other parties in other areas. What the Presidential assistant appeared to be saying in simplest terms, was that the United States would continue to be helpful in Europe's defence if Europe, on its side, would be more helpful to the United States in economic and diplomatic matters. A "revitalized Atlantic Partnership" [...] would evidently require some considerable revision of European attitudes in the direction of a greater "spirit of reciprocity" (Stebbins and Adams, 1976, p. 179).

In summary, relationship between the United States and the European Community between 1969 and 1974 underwent a downward course. It is noted that Washington needed the European Community as Brussels needed the United States. Disputes in economic and political areas emerged as the Washington and European Community had implemented unfavourable policy to each other. They accused each other of carrying out protectionism policy which adversely affected their economies. They had divergent views and responses to the 1973 Arab-Israel war and the consequent oil crisis. These economic and political frictions made the relations between the two sides sour, but it did not mean that the Europeans and the Americans could no longer cooperate with each other. They were actually so interdependent that those quarrels on economic and political areas could not break their relationship. The United States and the European Community had to coexist because they fully aware that their interests would be jeopardized if they did not reduce tensions between themselves or the other side were severely weakened in the world stage. Though the Nixon Administration focused much on burden-sharing in Atlantic alliance, and the European partners were not going to meet Washington's expectations, the United States remained an active and influential partner in this partnership. It again illustrated that despite the U.S. great role in security, stability and prosperity of the European Community, and the Europeans clearly understood this, it could not always force the European Community to do what it wanted. Still, the United States had to shoulder substantial cost to sustain the Atlantic alliance and nurture the relations between the Americans and the Europeans. The United States, as Kissinger said, could no longer lift up the tap by itself. However, the United States could no longer live in isolation; this nation needed Western Europe in the cause of sustaining its hegemony.

The United States and the European Community experienced a low point in their relations during the Nixon presidential years. This had negatively affected

European integration process. Yet, the Europeans would be optimistic about the future of the European integration process as Jean Monnet once underscored:

> The roots of the Community are strong now, and deep in the soil of Europe. They have survived some hard seasons, and can survive more. On the surface, appearances change. In a quarter century, naturally, new generations arise. With new ambitions, images of the past disappear; the balance of the world is altered. Yet amid this changing scenery the European idea goes on; and no one seeing it, and seeing how stable the Community institutions are, can doubt that this is a deep and powerful movement on an historic scale (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1980).

6. Conclusion

The United States and the European Community could not deny their economic and political interdependence. It was of strategic importance for them to find a way to coexist. This was what Kissinger strongly asserted: The United States – European Community alliance had to be "sustained by the hearts as well as the minds of its members" (Kissinger, 1979, p. 730). An uneasy partnership was what the United States and the European Community might perceive between 1969 and 1974. The U.S. attempts to join trade and diplomacy, economics and politics in dealing with the European Community's economic competition and political assertiveness somehow deteriorated the United States – European Community relations. Noticeably, the deterioration of the United States – European Community relations during the Nixon presidential years did not imply U.S. discontinuation of support for European prosperity and unity. The Nixon Administration still made it clear to the European governments that "We do not seek to dominate Europe; on the contrary we want a strong Europe" (Kissinger-Pompidou Meeting, 1973).

References

Commission of European Communities (1970), *Review of Economic and Trade Relations between the United States and the Community*, Brussels, retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/30052/1/P_8_70.pdf

Commission of European Communities (1972), Commercial relations between Japan, the United States and the European Community, Information Memo P-20/72, retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/30114/1/P_20_72.pdf

Devuyst, Y. (2007), American Attitudes on European Political Integration - The Nixon - Kissinger Legacy, *IES Working Paper*, No. 2.

Guy, V. (1971), New Opportunities or Challenges in the European Communities, retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/13800/1/S104.pdf

Hahn, W.F. (1972), Nuclear Balance in Europe, *Foreign Affairs*, retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1972-04-01/nuclear-balance-europe

Haldeman, H.R. (1994), The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Kaiser, K. (1974), Europe and America: A Critical Phase, *Foreign Affairs*, No. 52.

Kissinger, H. (1979), *White House Years*, Boston: Little Brown and Company Limited.

Kissinger-Pompidou Meeting (May 18, 1973), *Memorandum of Conversation*, retrieved from http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/ffus/00728.pdf

Larres, K. (2009), *Assertive Supremacy and Enlightened Self-interest: The United States and the 'Unity of Europe'*, retrieved from http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/larres.atp09.pdf

Lieber, R. (1967), *Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis*, Harvard: Centre for International Affairs.

Lieber, R. (1979), European and America in the World Energy Crisis, *International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 531-545.

Lieber, R. (1980), Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective, *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 4.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National, Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon (1973), *Next Steps in The Year of Europe*, retrieved from http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76ve15p2/pdf/frus1969-76ve15p2.pdf

National Security Study Memorandum 183 (1973), *Principles for a Declaration on Atlantic Relations*, retrieved from http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76ve15p2/pdf/frus1969-76ve15p2.pdf

Office of the Historian (1976) Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976 No. 38, retrieved from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d38

Palmer, J. (1988), *Europe without America? The Crisis in Atlantic Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Report on the Sixteenth Meeting of Members of Congress and the European Parliament on Congress and the European Parliament (1980), *Strengthening the Bonds*, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Smith, M. (1978), From the 'Year of Europe' to a Year of Carter: Continuing Patterns and Problems in Euro-American Relations, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, p.178.

Smith, M. (1988), *Western Europe and the United States: The Uncertain Alliance*, London: George Allen & Unwin.

Stebbins, R.B. and Adams, E.P. (1976), *1973: A Documentary Record*, New York: Foreign American Relations.

Strömvik, M. (2005), Balancing Global Influence: The “transatlantic conflict syndrome” and the CFSP, retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/3099/1/EUSA_paper_final.pdf

Weisbrode, K. (2009), *The Atlantic Century Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America’s Vital Alliance with Europe*, Boston: Da Capo Press.