

# The EU-UN cooperation for maintaining international peace and security

Anna YAMCHUK\*

## Abstract

*The prevention of conflicts and keeping peace appear to be not an easy task. Violent conflicts still break out while some situations remain quite fragile, threatening to create serious regional problems. The United Nations uses a wide range of actions in order to ease tensions and insure the peaceful settlement of crises. Regional organizations cannot be left aside of these processes as well, since in the modern world of interdependence, responsibilities are shared. The European Union has been actively engaged in conducting peace operations since 2003. Naturally, these actions require cooperation with the UN. The peace process in the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires a thoughtful approach, financial means and significant human resources in order to be successful. The EU and the UN can benefit from joining efforts since working together might ease some difficulties in keeping peace that otherwise an organization has to face by standing alone.*

**Keywords:** peace operations, crisis management, military operations, Security and Defence Policy

## 1. Introduction

Modern realities have been constantly putting to a test the defence and security mechanisms available at the disposal of international community. After the end of the Cold-war, there were expectations of tensions' decrease and of further development of soft power in inter-state relations. However, numerous conflicts around the world, both inter- and intra-state by nature, have caused deep concerns among leading politicians, states and organizations. That led to discussions on ways to improve the international mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

The international responsibility for peace and security is granted to the United Nations (UN), as the primary goal of the organization is "to save

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\* Anna Yamchuk is postgraduate student at Department of International Relations of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Chernivtsi, Ukraine; e-mail: anna\_yamchuk@ukr.net.

succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations, 1945, p.2). To achieve the set goal, the UN has worked out a certain system which may be joined under the common term “peace operations”. However, the Charter of the organization does not forbid regional organizations themselves to step in when it comes to crisis situations. To that matter, Chapter VIII of the Charter specifically emphasizes that “the Security Council (SC) shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or by regional agencies” (UN, 1945).

Regional organizations enjoyed that right many times in past. They have created mechanisms on settling conflicts of their own. Still, no enforcement actions might be taken without prior authorization from the Security Council. Hence, regional agencies are obliged to cooperate with the UN notwithstanding of developing a security policy of their own.

The European Union (EU) has conducted a number of peace operations recently. Some of them were enhancing UN peace missions while others were performed almost independently. Past experience has proved that the EU-UN cooperation in the security and peace field may bring positive outcomes, however there are some serious challenges to deal with. Since it is obvious today that security issues will not be taken aside the international agenda in the nearest future, the assessment of organizations’ cooperation might help to clear up some issues in order to achieve a new level of understanding, sharing the burden of responsibility and creating a safe environment. It is especially important in the context of the security situation in Eastern Europe today.

Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine the EU-UN cooperation in the security field. First, it is necessary to discuss the theories and concepts of international relations that make attempts to explain the EU’s actions for maintaining peace and security. Approaches and thoughts of realists, neorealists and neofunctionalists will be outlined in the article. Further, the position of scholars from the Copenhagen school on such concepts as constructivism and security communities will be brought to the attention. In the second part, the paper will address the UN mechanism of maintaining peace and security, the normative framework for the UN-EU cooperation in this field and present a brief history of the EU’s engagement in conducting military and civil operations. In the last part, it will look for modern trends in the EU-UN peace cooperation, revealing certain opportunities as well as miscalculations and shortcomings.

## **2. Theoretical approach to the EU’s regional security and peace policy**

Recent years have witnessed the EU commencing a new phase of security and peace policy. Major questions have been set on the political agenda. How should this common policy be shaped? What level of sovereignty has to be yielded to supranational institutions? Is there a just peace within Europe? Should any steps be taken by the EU to insure peace outside of Europe? While all

questions are still more or less open, there are no doubts regarding the EU's becoming a global actor actively engaged in international relations. There is a number of theories and concepts that attempt to explain the meaning of security for the EU and, therefore, its actions at regional and international levels.

Looking from the realists' perspective, one might say that the actions of the EU are simply meant to serve the interests of certain states. E.H. Carr and H. Morgenthau claimed that there was no harmony of interests among states. Each state pursues its own national objectives and shapes its policy accordingly. Hence, the role of international institutions is limited. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the World War II was quite often shown as a vivid proof to that statement (Amin, Naseer, Ishtiaq, 2011). A new realistic approach towards international relations emerged with the work of K.N. Waltz "*Theory of International Politics*" in 1979, which laid the foundation for neorealism or structural realism (Waltz, 1979). K.N. Waltz pays special attention to the international system, discussing states' behaviour within it and depreciating the role of international institutions. The scholar argues that "in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena" (Waltz, 2000, p. 5). That means that each actor has to work out its way in satisfying its interests. Hence, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 'liberation of Europe' both parts of Europe had "to learn to take care of themselves or suffer the consequences" (Waltz, 1993, p. 76). In the early works of K.N.Waltz, the issue of the European unity is described in a rather pessimistic tone (Waltz, 1993). While states have already made some steps towards unity, the most difficult part is yet to come. The scholar claims that "the economic unity is not easily achieved, but the final decision to form a single, effective political entity that controls foreign and military policies as well as economic ones is the most difficult" (Waltz, 1993, p. 73).

Nevertheless, nowadays we observe a new level of integration within the EU community, which goes beyond the economic sphere. According to neofunctionalism, it was to be expected. From the point of view of neofunctionalists, the integration process, which starts with the creation of economic integration, might end with establishing a political community or a supranational state. Therefore, neofunctionalists suggest a step-by-step method for establishing a political community starting from economic sectors (Özen, 1998).

In defining the political community, Ernst B. Haas, the founder of neofunctionalism, claimed that "it is a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space" (Haas, 1968, p.5). This kind of community is being set by a process of political integration, which is the "process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas,

1958, p. 16). A more reserved approach was proposed by L.N. Lindberg. The scholar's idea was that political integration might be achieved even without moving toward a political community. The political integration was considered as "arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous actions by national governments" (Lindberg, 1963, p. 5).

The neofunctionalists' approach to security and foreign policy issues has been criticized by constructivists, who argued that "the core concept offered by neofunctionalism does not reflect the dynamics of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy's development" (Chebakova, 2008, p. 9). Constructivism, introduced by Nicholas Onuf, emphasizes the important role of identity in shaping the interest of states. Identity is what shapes their behavior as well. Hence, norms and ideas are key points in defining the actors' policy. Constructivism however does not reject the matter of interests in the international arena. But these are identities that are the basis of interest (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). States do want to survive and be secure (Fietta, p. 3). Thus, power and interests matter in world politics, but it is the shared knowledge which determines their significance, while the shared knowledge "can be conflictual or cooperative" (Wendt, 1999, p. 141).

Constructivists argue that international institutions play an important role by transmitting the norms of international society. In this way, they might shape state policies since the latter "do not always know what they want" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 128). Hence, issues like peace, non-violent settlement of disputes, common security can be perceived as those international views transmitted to the EU's countries. Some scholars claim that it is constructivism that can be applied as an overarching theoretical framework in the analysis of the EU's global 'actorness'. In their opinion, this is reflected in the main official EU documents like the European Security Strategy "Secure Europe in a Better World" (Chebakova, 2008). This document represents the ideas and norms of a collective entity. These norms have been constructed by member-states and outline their will to step aside the entity's borders (Chebakova, 2008, p. 7).

After the end of the Cold war era, constructivist scholars worked with the concept of security community. At that time, the concept, introduced by K. Deutsch, re-emerged in international relations. A security community is "a region in which large-scale use of violence has become very unlikely or even unthinkable" (Tusicisny, 2007, p. 425). In the concept of security communities, the leading role is given to trust and predictability (Väyrynen, 2000, p. 109). Thus, people in a security community are bound by "the sense of community, the mutual sympathy and common interest" (Tusicisny, 2007, p. 426). Security community can evolve from nascent to ascendant to mature. Mature communities can be either loosely or tightly coupled. Loosely-coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional properties. Tightly coupled security communities have a "mutual aid" society in which they construct

collective system arrangements. These communities possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 30). R. Väyrynen (2000) and A. Tuscisny (2007) differentiated comprehensive from interstate security communities. While the former means that neither interstate nor civil wars is possible, the latter refers to the regions where interstate war is unthinkable, but large-scale violence is still possible within the state. The distinctive feature of a security community is that stable peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community. A community is defined by three characteristics:

- Members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings;
- Those in a community have many-sided and direct relations;
- Communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism (Adler *et al.*, 1998, p. 31).

States may form a security community if the current state of the international system increases “unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units concerned” (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957, p.115). The notion of security in this concept can be interpreted as “peace” and a security community is thus a peace community (Väyrynen, 2000, p. 111).

Security issues were also broadly discussed by representatives of the Copenhagen school. Security is seen as “a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 24). The Copenhagen school introduced the sectors’ concept to security issues. According to scholars like B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. de Wilde one may talk about military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 27). Though all mentioned sectors are important, in the context of this research, the emphasis should be placed on the political and military sectors. Representatives of the Copenhagen school argue that a security community has formed within the EU based on the integration project (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 352). The integration was particularly necessary since the main ‘trouble’ for Europe in the post-Cold war era was avoiding a return to its own past as this past was filled with wars and power balancing (Buzan *et al.*, 2003). That is why any conflict at the EU borders is dangerous. They jeopardize EU security by the possibility of dragging European powers into a conflict on opposing sides that might trigger the return to power politics (Buzan *et al.*, 2003). In this case, regional stability and peace are of paramount importance. However, the global security matters as well. Scholars of the Copenhagen school argued that political security might be thought of in defence of the system-level referents, such as international society or international law (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 141). The central role as the repository of the basic principles of international society and international law belongs to the UN. The one collective actor, endowed with a formalized role as a securitizing actor, is the Security Council. The fact that two European countries hold

permanent membership at the UNSC and enjoy roles of individual players has complicated the process of the EU's transforming into a global power. Back in 2003, B.Bizan *et al.* claimed that "the global presence of Europe is inconsistent, stronger on issues like international trade, monetary matters and the environment than on most highly political questions" (Buzan *et al.*, 2003, p. 374).

2003-2014 witnesses a fundamental change in the EU's perception on the international stage. As further discussed in this article, not only does the EU actively support the international missions undertaken by the UN, but it also acts independently quite often in such spheres as maintaining peace and security within Europe as well as outside.

### **3. UN peace operations**

Since 1945, the UN has developed a range of activities for preventing and solving conflicts that constitute a threat to international peace and security. The main tools are conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. It is important to understand differences and similarities among the actions mentioned above.

Conflict prevention involves the "application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict" (United Nations, 2008, p.17). That means that the Secretary-General may undertake "good offices" in order to create an environment favourable for the parties of a conflict to start negotiation and avert violent clashes. The concept of "conflict prevention" has evolved over the past decades. It was given some extra thought in the "Agenda for Peace", delivered by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The Secretary-General stressed upon the fact that the most desirable employment of diplomacy was to ease tensions before it broke out in a conflict and that in some cases preventive deployment might be required (United Nations, 1992). The issue of preventive deployment by either the UN or any regional organization has not been entirely clarified yet; however, as it will be pointed out later, this option was used on several occasions.

Peacemaking involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Its tools are stated primarily in Chapter VI of the UN Charter: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements (UN, 1945). Usually, peacemaking is used to address conflicts in progress (UN, 2008).

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve peace where fighting has been halted (UN, 2008). Today, peacekeeping missions have been deployed to many countries all over the world. Peacekeepers are implementing various tasks set in the Security Council's resolution that authorises a mission. The role of peacekeeping operations has evolved over the past decades from being

basically observing by nature to fulfilling a number of activities including military, police and civilian components.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization by the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are undertaken by a coalition of “willing states” or regional organizations with the permission of the UN on the grounds of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Peacebuilding aims at laying the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding measures seek to enhance the capacity of the state to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions (UN, 2008).

All types of activities mentioned above have been used by the UN to address disputes and help the countries that had been engaged in conflicts to step on the road of postconflict development. Usually, a few kinds of peace operations are used at once, either by the UN itself or with the help of other international actors.

In assessing peace missions, led by the UN, special attention should be paid to peacekeeping operations that have become a core business of the organization in peace and security field over the last years. As of the beginning of 2014, the UN is conducting 15 peacekeeping missions with 117 023 total field personnel from 122 countries across 4 continents (UN, 2014). The European Union and the African Union are the two main international partners of the UN while performing peacekeeping tasks. The peacekeeping missions of the UN are overseen by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Since 1948, 53 peacekeeping operations have been completed. The Department of Political Affairs manages political missions and peace-building support offices engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. As of February 2014, the UN has been conducting 12 political missions in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Given the numbers provided above, one might notice that the UN peacekeeping is heavily overstretched these days. For example, as of September 2011, the United Nations military deployment was of 83 368 people, while numbers of the AU and the EU were 9 754 and 2 777 respectively (Gowan and Sherman, 2012). Quite often, the UN faces problems like the lack of personnel for certain missions, the inadequate level of equipment and financial means for specified tasks and what appears to be the most serious problem – the lack of political will from member states to support the organization in its aspiration of securing peace.

#### **4. The normative framework of the UN-EU cooperation in the peace and security sphere**

The UN-EU cooperation in the security field intensified in the late 1990s. After the European Council of Cologne in 1999 that institutionalised a European Security and Defence Policy, the idea of launching concrete actions by the EU was put into motion (Novosseloff, 2012). In 2001, the document “EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management” identifying key areas for cooperation such as “conflict prevention”, “civilian and military aspects of crisis management” and “practical regional issues” was elaborated (Tardy, 2005).

Further on, in the same year, the Göteborg European Council issued a document, “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”. The document defined the guiding principles for the EU in cooperation with other institutions – “added value”, “interoperability”, “visibility” and “decision-making autonomy” (European Council, 2001). The document stated the following options for operations:

- EU Member States can contribute nationally to an operation led by international organizations, without any EU co-ordination;
- EU Member States can contribute nationally to such an operation, but by following the EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool resources;
- A co-ordinated EU contribution could be provided to an operation led by an international organization;
- The EU could provide and lead a whole component (e.g. police) in an operation under the overall lead of an international organization. A model could be a Kosovo type situation, with a pillar structure between different organizations and under the leadership of one of them;
- The EU could lead an operation, but with some components provided by international organizations with particular expertise and experience in relevant fields;
- The EU could lead an autonomous operation (European Council, 2001).

In 2003, the EU-UN cooperation was confirmed by signing the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management. The Declaration was signed after both organizations had already experienced the first practical co-work in the security field in Africa and the Balkans. Hence, it aimed at deepening the cooperation further on. The parties confirmed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council (Council of the European Union, 2003). Therefore, the EU reasserted its commitment to support the UN in crisis management in the framework of the UN Charter. The parties agreed on establishing a joint consultative mechanism to work on enhancing cooperation especially in areas like planning, training, communication and best practices. Such a mechanism,



named Steering Committee, was established at working level to enhance mutual cooperation in the areas set by the Joint Declaration (Tardy, 2005). The Steering Committee was envisaged to meet twice a year for increasing coordination between bodies involved in peace policy from both organizations. However, it did not always happen this way. For example, none of the scheduled twice-a year meetings was held in 2010 and 2011 (Pietz, 2013).

Notwithstanding the fact of how the agreement was fulfilled, it should be acknowledged that the EU was the first organization to sign a cooperation declaration with the UN. That can be interpreted as the twenty-first century practical recognition of Chapter VIII status (Winther, 2013).

Additional liaison mechanisms, available for the UN-EU cooperation in the security field, are DPKO Liaison Office in Brussels, DPKO officials attending EU PSC and Education Days (Koops, 2012).

The normative framework was expanded in 2007, when a Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was adopted. In this Statement, the parties recognized the significant enhancement of the UN-EU cooperation since 2003. As a major progress in conducting operations in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East was noted. The UN and the EU stated their willingness to promote this kind of cooperation in the future.

There was a favourable ground for deepening common work since, until 2007, the EU Battlegroups were fully operational. The idea of “battle groups” was proposed in 2003 by France and the United Kingdom and endorsed by the EU Council in December that year. The concept was about the creation of “credible battle-groups” of 1500 troops to be deployed on a short notice and on a short-term basis (Novosseloff, 2012). The creation of rapid force has also been worked out by the UN, however, unsuccessfully. As Adam Roberts has observed, “since 2004 the idea of a UN standing force was not dead, but it was in suspended animation” (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010, p. 169). The possibility of engaging “battle groups” in response to requests from the UN Security Council was agreed by organizations in the Statement (Council of the European Union, 2007). This chance was especially important for the UN, which suffered many times because of being unable to deploy rapid forces in troublesome areas.

The Statement envisaged the enhancement of cooperation in areas “including, but not limited to: support to African peacekeeping capacity-building; cooperation on aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform; exchanges between the UN and EU Situation Centers” etc (Council of the European Union, 2007).

The ambiguous plan was not entirely realised because of the constraints limiting EU and UN peacekeeping actions and unwillingness of the organizations themselves. For example, when the UN requested the EU for rapid military deployment during the deterioration of situation in Congo in 2008, it

received no reinforcements (Gowan and Sherman, 2012). In fact, the “battle groups mechanism”, mentioned in the Joint Statement since the date of its creation, has not been used as any strategic reserve for UN operations (Novosseloff, 2012).

The common work of organizations can be described by T. Tardy’s words: “it is the EU rather than the UN that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the UN-EU relationship, which is characterised by a divide between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer” (Tardy, 2005, p.49).

### **5. Practical experience of common work in peace operations**

In 2003, the EU launched its first peace operations. In January 2003, following a Council Joint Action adopted on 11 March 2002 and on the basis of an invitation from the Bosnian authorities, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This operation was not created by the UN Security Council that proved a certain degree of EU independence in conducting the security policy in the region. However, EU actions did not infringe the UN Charter since EUPM was not of a coercive nature. Adopting resolution 1396, the UNSC acknowledged and welcomed the EUPM encouraging smooth transition of responsibilities from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Police Task Force (United Nations, 2002). The transition process was tightly coordinated and lasted for 5 months. The last head of the IPTF continued in this position with the new EU mission (Pietz, 2013). It is worth mentioning that this EU mission was entirely supported by the EU member states.

2003 saw the deployment of the first military operation of the EU. It was Operation Concordia launched in March in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the basis of an invitation from the Macedonian authorities. That is another case of EU operation creation without formal authorization from the UN Security Council. However, the UN endorsed this decision since the organization itself was deadlocked on that specific issue. The fact is that, in 1992, the UN established its own mission in Macedonia responding to a request made in November 1992 by Macedonia’s President, Kiro Gligorov. This operation is one of the few examples of preventive deployment, created by the SC resolution 795. The mission grew out of an already existing operation UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force, deployed to manage the ongoing conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Until March 1995, peacekeepers in Macedonia were formally united under the title – UNPROFOR FYROM (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia) Command. With resolution 983, the Security Council changed the mission’s name to UNPREDEP – the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia. However, in 1999, the mission’s activity was terminated by Chinese veto on its extension. Incapable of changing the situation, the UN passed the peace work to the OSCE and the EU (Bellamy

*et al.*, 2010). UN Security Council resolution 1371 (2001) supported the “security presence in Macedonia”, but that was a reference to NATO not the EU. As a matter of fact, the EU operation did take over the NATO operation “Allied Harmony”. It was one of the missions deployed by NATO to help implementing the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia, but it lasted no longer than 30 days. Concordia was composed of around 350 personnel coming from 27 countries. 13 of them were EU member states (Tardy and Windmar, 2003). In December 2003, Operation Concordia was replaced by even a smaller EU police mission – Operation Proxima.

Further major involvement of the EU in international peace actions took place in May 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Operation called “Artemis” was specifically created on a request from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. In 2003, the UN was conducting its peacekeeping operation in DRC – MONUC. The rapid aggravation of the security situation in the eastern part of the country made the UN take more resolute decisions. Secretary-General addressing the Security Council stated the necessity of the rapid deployment to Bunia of highly trained and well equipped force under the lead of a Member State (United Nations, 2003). That is why by adopting Resolution 1484 on May 30, 2003 the SC established an Interim Emergency Multinational Force. The EU supported the UN mission by deployment of almost 1800 soldiers from twelve countries to the DRC in the summer of the same year (Pietz, 2013). Attention should be paid to the fact that the contribution from European Union member states directly to the MONUC as of 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2003 comprised 44 uniformed personnel. These members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which makes 9 countries out of 52 contributing states to the UN mission, totalling 4 575 people.

“Artemis” was placed under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee. France was playing the key role, being “the framework nation” (Tardy, 2005). It is necessary to mention here that the official papers of the UN authorizing the mission in 2003 did not refer to the operation as a “EU-led mission”. Thus, welcoming a deployment of the mission, the Secretary-General mentioned “a multinational force led by France” (United Nations, 2003, p.7). After the departure of Artemis, the EU was asked by the UN-Secretariat to re-hat some of their assets to make them available to the UN. However, the request was dismissed by Europeans. Moreover, none of the EU states participated in the new strengthened force of the United Nations that took over Artemis (Tardy, 2005).

Operation Artemis was not the last peace action undertaken by the EU in the DRC. Out of 15 operations involving UN-EU cooperation in 2003-2012, 4 were launched in the DRC. No other country of the world has enjoyed this high level of EU peacemaking attention. Two of the mentioned missions were deployed by an authorization from the UN Security Council, while two others

were held as parallel missions. In general, in 2003-2012, the EU held 15 peace operations that involved cooperation with the UN: 5 of them took place in Europe, 1 – in Asia and 9 – in Africa (Novosseloff, 2012).

Notably, the majority of these peace operations by the EU were held in Africa. Back in 2004, the EU adopted the EU Common Position on the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts stating that “the European Union will support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities, at regional, subregional and bilateral levels” (Council of the European Union, 2004). This point found its further development in a number of documents in the next years. For example, the “Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa” defined the principles and actions of a possible EU involvement in the crisis management in Africa.

As of 2014, the EU had 15 completed and 16 ongoing civilian and military missions. Such actions of the EU, deploying operations all over the world, even in regions quite distant from Europe itself, might prove the point of “EU becoming a global actor” of international relations.

## **6. Modern trends of the EU-UN cooperation in the peace field**

An important trend appeared to be visible in new missions launched by the EU in 2011-2012. Unlike early initiatives in 2003-2008, the EU no longer defined the need for coordination of its security policy with existing or new UN-led missions. In fact, the EU oriented these missions towards European regional interests and greater visibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Pietz, 2013).

The recent EU involvement in peace actions in Mali and Libya proves that the organization is quite determined to proceed with the peace and security policy all around the world. The decision on Libya was passed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2011. It included the phrase “if requested by the United Nations Office for the operation called ‘EUFOR Libya’, in order to support humanitarian assistance in the region” (Council of the European Union, 2011, p. 2).

The wording in the EU Council’s decisions proved that EU-UN cooperation is still on the agenda. The mission was indeed created, but not in the manner envisaged in 2011.

Since May 22, 2013 the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) has been fulfilling its tasks. It was established as a civilian mission in response to an invitation by the state and aims at supporting Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders (European External Action Service, 2013). Meanwhile, there is also a UN-led mission in Libya, launched in 2011 and overseen by the Department of Political Affairs – The United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

Acting in response to the situation in Mali, the EU was supporting other international actors in their efforts to bring peace in various ways. For example, in

January 2013, the EU confirmed the contribution of €50 million to support the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (European Commission, 2013). Some of the European states contributed troops to the UN-led mission in Mali, authorized by the Security Council resolution 2100 on the 25<sup>th</sup> of April 2013 (United Nations, 2013). As of January 31, 2014 the total contribution from the EU-member states was around 170 people to the UN mission of 6 802 (United Nations, 2014). At the same time, in February 2013, the European Union launched its own training mission for Malian armed forces. 23 member states contributed to the mission of 551 military personnel (Peace Operations 2013/2014). The latest mission, established by the EU, was launched in February 2014 to contribute to a secure environment in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA, 2014).

Increasing peace activities by the EU leads to a decrease of European states' interest in UN missions. The statement can be easily proved by numbers. By comparing average monthly total contributions to UN peacekeeping by 15 EU countries (as of 2000) in 2000, 2003 and 2013 one might notice that numbers are quite low (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Average monthly total contributions to UN peacekeeping**

Contributor	2000	2003	2013
Austria	735	442	346
Belgium	16	15	134
Denmark	113	63	31
Finland	645	173	231
France	491	326	957
Germany	461	383	229
Greece	27	27	63
Ireland	761	200	406
Italy	179	176	1209
Luxemburg	-	-	-
Netherlands	235	92	41
Portugal	889	695	2
Spain	170	66	635
Sweden	175	142	60
United Kingdom	545	594	288
Total	5 442	3 994	4 632

*Source:* United Nations, Troop and Police Contributors (2014)

Hence, in 2000, 15 EU-members contributed to the UN 5 442 personnel, which was 16 % of the world total contribution. The number went down in the following years on the background of the increasing contribution from developing states. In 2003, the contribution from the 15 mentioned EU countries was 8.7% and in 2013 – 4.8%.

The same situation is with other countries of Europe that joined the EU in 2004. For example, if in 2003, Hungary's contribution to the UN peacekeeping was 139 uniformed personnel, in 2013, it made 89. Poland's contribution was 736 and 11 persons, respectively. Obviously, it has something to do with European states' involvement in peace activities performed by other organizations, but the influence of the EU's independent security policy is undeniable.

The other important trend of EU peace policy nowadays is its stronger autonomy in decision-making and operations' conducting. This independence starts with the terminology used by the organization. The EU refers to its activity in this field as "crisis management" and defines it as military and civilian operations. That does not correspond to the terminology used by the UN. Obviously, such actions do not infringe any international law, but bring additional confusion to the system of maintaining peace.

Past experience proved that, in complex missions, it is vitally important to preserve a unity of chain of command, since conducting parallel operations under different leadership can cause serious problems as it was, for example, in Somalia. Thus, the issue of setting some general rules for organizations launching parallel operations, which pertains not only to the EU-UN cooperation but to such kind of work in general, may be an important step forward.

The majority of EU missions aim at promoting the rule of law, providing border assistance, training for local police and army etc. UN missions usually have a much longer mandate, so European efforts could be a great complementary component to any international peace initiative.

## **7. Conclusions**

United Nations peace operations are seriously overstretched nowadays. Unfortunately, a number of local and regional conflicts demand resolute and urgent actions. Since it has been emphasized on many occasions that the UN does not wage war, the issue of creating the UN standing force has been causing tensions among Member states themselves, leaving the problem of a rapid response to the conflict unresolved. The other challenge for UN peace actions is caused by the veto-power of the permanent members of its Security Council. That is why there are situations when the UN appears to be deadlocked.

These are important reasons for regional organizations to step in. History has seen examples of successful peace missions conducted by both the UN and regional organizations together, as well as separate actions of the latter.

The European Union was the first organization to sign the declaration on cooperation with the UN. Hence, today, the UN considers the EU one of its main partners in peace actions around the world. That pertains not only to the European continent, since the EU is acting also in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

If the issue of cooperation is worked out in the right way, everyone will benefit from it – the UN, the EU and the world in general. However, there are still many issues to discuss in order to create a true partnership and not a competition. It is a necessary way to go, since the latest events in the world, in general, and in the Europe, in particular, have proved that the peace mechanism of the UN and the EU has its shortcomings, sometimes being unable to keep true, positive peace.

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