The Europeanization of official development assistance: EU governance by cooperation - communication and domestic change

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Abstract

Development policy and official development assistance belong to domestic policies where Europeanization has appeared almost from the very beginning of the European integration process. However, the official development assistance (ODA) has been Europeanized in the cooperation - communication governance mode which is less intensively studied by scholars than other, more strict governance patterns. Based on a three-dimensional governance Europeanization model, the paper hopes to capture the key trends in the evolution of the cooperation - communication governance mode within the area, as well as related changes in volumes, geographical assistance, and thematic focus of national ODA programmes. In doing so, it emphasizes the relationship between the form of the cooperation - communication mode (which is showed to change considerably over time) and the up-loading, cross-loading, and downloading of ODA patterns within the EU.

Keywords: Europeanization, official development assistance, governance, cooperation - communication governance mode, policy coordination

JEL classification: F15, O19, O52

1. Introduction

Since the earliest stages of research on Europeanization, domestic changes in national politics, polities, as well as policies resulting from the on-going process of European integration have been examined from various perspectives. There has been intensive inquiry into domestic implementation of EU policies

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within typical domains of European policy-making, including, inter alia, environment, agriculture, and transport (Vink, Graziano, 2007). Nevertheless, abundant literature on the Europeanization of domestic policies\(^1\) still leaves many issues unclear, with many gaps.

Official development assistance (ODA)\(^2\) belongs to such issues for two reasons. First, as Arts and Dickinson (2003) point out, it had not drawn attention of scholars sufficiently until the middle of the last decade. The situation has been improving only in recent years due to a more intensive reflection of wide-ranging changes in both international and European development assistance approaches.\(^3\)

Second, the specific nature of ODA (or in a broader sense of development policy) made it rather difficult to integrate ODA into the traditional interpretative frames developed by the first generation of Europeanization research.\(^4\) Although ODA belonged to the first pillar of the EU, since its legal base was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the key elements of its agenda were never implemented by EU regulations and directives legally binding for Member States. Therefore, the methods applied by Europeanization scholars, when examining other first pillar policies, were of lesser relevance within the area.

The following paper claims that ODA belongs to the areas where Europeanization appears. Its further aim is to identify the key mechanisms through which the Europeanization of ODA takes place, as well as the most striking patterns of domestic change at the Member State level. As it argues that the Europeanization of ODA started at an early stage of the European integration process (before the inclusion of development assistance in the primary legislation of the EU), a historical analysis of its origins is first employed. The core of the paper, however, explores the current shape of the cooperation – communication governance mode, applied by the EU in the field of ODA, and domestic changes at the Member State level arising from the requirements of the EU. Empirical evidence is based on the programme documents and the policy papers of European bodies (especially the European Commission), and national governments.

\(^{1}\) For a brief overview see e.g. Börzel, Risse, 2007 or Sverdrup, 2007.

\(^{2}\) For the purpose of the following paper, ODA is understood in accordance with the OECD (2003) statistical definition as “Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount)”.

\(^{3}\) New titles dealing with the recent changes of the EU and its Member States’ development assistance include e.g. Mold (ed.), 2007; Carbone, 2007; Hoebink (ed.), 2009; Morrissey (ed.), 2011.

\(^{4}\) The first and the second generation of the Europeanization research are distinguished e.g. in Dyson, Goetz (ed.), 2003.
In accordance with the ends, the text is organized as follows: Section 1 provides the necessary theoretical background for the Europeanization of the ODA analysis. Drawing on the theoretical basis, chronologically organized sections 2-3 map the principal events in the evolution of European governance within the field of ODA and elaborate their possible consequences for Member States’ national development assistance policies until 2000. Sections 4-6 demonstrate the gradually growing Europeanization potential in the last decade, with special emphasis on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of ODA, and the recent impacts of the European Consensus on Development.

Unlike the mainstream of Europeanization studies which usually focuses on a limited number of Member States, the paper attempts to capture the basic trends across the whole membership base of the EC/EU in each period concerning three general features of ODA – volume, geographical distribution, and thematic focus. This is inevitably at the expense of the depth of analysis. However, as research in this area is at the very beginning, such mapping is entirely appropriate and will undoubtedly bring incentives for narrower and deeper scholarly work on the topic.

2. Theoretical background

When the study of Europeanization started in the first half of the 1990s, it was a response to the earlier European integration research concerned primarily with the emergence of European institutions, governance system, and supranational decision-making processes from a bottom-up perspective. Yet, the area covered by the first-generation research was limited to the fields of the so-called positive integration where EU institutions, as supranational actors, develop, stipulate, and enforce policy templates to be adopted at the level of Member States (Bulmer, Radaelli, 2004). In the areas where other integration patterns prevailed, the explanatory power of the first generation approaches soon turned out to be insufficient and other explications were sought.

As a consequence, a comprehensive interpretative second-generation scheme of Europeanization emerged covering both positive and other types of integration. It was presented by Wong’s three-dimensional model of Europeanization. Wong’s concept (2007) included the top-down dimension, emphasized by the first-generation research, which enables national institutions to react and adapt to the demands of the EU (known as “downloading”). However, unlike the first-generation research, this dimension was combined more extensively with a bottom-up process (“uploading”) used by states to project their national preferences and ideas into the policies which are created at the level of the EU and with the process of subsequent identity reconstructions and its convergence around a shared notion of common EU identity and interest (“crossloading”).
Simultaneously with Wong’s concept, a governance (or policy-analysis) approach developed by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004), Knill and his co-authors (e.g. Bauer, Knill, Pitschel, 2007; Knill, Lenschow, 2005), or Börzel (2010) emerged. It classified the alternative mechanisms of Europeanization according to the governance or policy modes applied by European institutions. When doing so, they distinguish between governance by (1) hierarchy (2) coercion / compliance, (3) competition, and (4) cooperation - communication.

ODA belongs to those integration areas where supranational institutions are weak because intergovernmental (unanimous) decision-making dominates and outputs are not taken in the form of legally binding instruments. These areas only serve as centres for the exchange of experience and information, i.e. only governance by cooperation and communication appears there. Policies are Europeanized predominantly in the horizontal direction which means that the cross-loading based on soft regulation prevails.

However, when a policy is under construction, it is also Europeanized in a bottom-up direction. Whatever form of vertical (top-down) or horizontal policy accommodation at the level of Member States appears, it ensues from the developments at the level of the EU which are based on the process of negotiation. As Börzel (2010) and Wong (2007) point out, states seek to upload their national-policy styles during negotiations in order to minimize adaptation costs, gain new institutional resources and support from allies, and to be able to boost their profiles themselves in new regions or new topics.

Governance modes are always evolving. They transform one into the other with the deepening of the European integration and related transfers of competences from Member States to communitarian bodies in the primary legislation of the EU. Thus, although the relationship between governance and the processes of Europeanization, as strictly separated variables, could be subjected to a causal analysis at a specific moment (e.g. when comparing various EU policies), in a wider time frame, causal questions are of lesser relevance. A search for a broader understanding of governance and Europeanization as mutually constituted phenomena using additional data and variables seems more appropriate. ODA should be treated in this way for its long tradition within the path of the European integration process, as well as for the gradual evolution of cooperation - communication governance mode strongly affected by the obstacles to Europeanization.

3. Limits to governance and Europeanization of ODA prior to the Treaty of Maastricht

As stated above, ODA, as well as development policy in a broader sense belong to the original policies which began at the earliest stages of the European integration process. Their origins are related to the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and to the association of the Member
States’ colonial dependencies. From the very start, ODA was significant but by no means a single tool of development policy. For example, development policy was also implemented by trade policies toward developing countries. The direct ODA of the Community was channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF) and conceived as an addition to and a complement of bilateral Member States’ aid programmes.

Despite the fact that the EDF was administered by the European Commission, the gradually emancipating colonial possessions of Member States remained the centre of attention. The distribution of the European ODA was the subject of debate between the Member States which had a more regional (Africa) and global focus for quite a long time. Initially, former colonial powers, especially France, were more influential in the bargaining over the nature of assistance. France was the first country to up-load its requirements (including many patterns of its colonial expenditures) to the level of the Community. Through the creation of the EDF, it partially eased its assistance burden and passed it on to Germany and the Netherlands (Grilli, 1994).

The redistribution of the assistance burden may be understood as an initial pattern of Europeanization in this area. Domestic change induced by the process manifested itself primarily in the geographical orientation of the Member States’ bilateral ODA programmes. Moreover, the addition of the assistance at the community level to gradually evolving national development aid programmes could also have influenced the thematic focus of the Member States’ bilateral ODA in the top-down direction (c.f. Arts, 2000; Van Reisen, 2000). However, the EEC (especially the European Commission) was not able to make use of its unique toolbox sufficiently. It often did the same things as Member States in their bilateral relations with developing countries.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that most initiatives regarding coordination at the level of the EU encountered resistance from Member States. The resistance manifested so strongly that it prevented the implementation of even moderate exchanges of information and harmonization (as well as reductions in overbidding, double usage, and gaps) in various aid flows directed to the same development countries which finally resulted in a reduction in aid effectiveness.

4. Missed opportunity of the 3 Cs in the Treaty of Maastricht

A greater willingness of Member States to accept the Commission’s coordination was first apparent at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. However, such acceptance did not result from internal developments in the EC but from new external challenges and pressures. It closely related to the dissolution of the Eastern block and the end of the Cold War and, respectively, to the need for financial support of transformation processes. The increase in the total volume of
assistance, more effective aid flows, and better coordination could serve this purpose (Grilli, 1994).

As an intergovernmental conference was then preparing the transformation of the Community into the EU, a new design of ODA obtained its legal basis in primary legislation immediately. The Treaty of Maastricht included development policy in the first pillar of the Union. It also defined its general objectives and basic principles for the first time. The principles were articulated in the form of the so-called “three Cs”: Complementarity, Coherence, and Coordination (Treaty on European Union, 1991, title II, article G, section 3q; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht, 1991, Articles 130u-y). The cooperation - communication governance mode was, thus, formally established. The 3-Cs principles created a significant room for a top-down dimension of Europeanization, at least theoretically.

On the other hand, development assistance in the aftermath of Maastricht continued to function as a mixed system comprising separate national policies and the collective policy of the EU. As revealed, for example, by the global evaluation reports of EuropeAid (1998 a,b; 1999), there were still too many obstacles to coordination at both the operational and the more general level by that time.

Relating to the Member States, the obstacles included differences in planning and budget cycles, and reluctance to change the existing routine approaches in favour of new, common ones. Furthermore, as mentioned in the ACP evaluation (EuropeAid, 1998a, chapter 1.2), many Members continued their earlier efforts to up-load their preferences and agendas to the level of the EU, instead of searching for a more realistic and strategic European agenda. Due to a fragmentation of their development programmes and weak cooperation between different actors of national development policies, European institutions were thus forced to expand the number of policy priorities and search for compromises, instead of specializing in a few areas of the Community’s comparative advantages and taking a leading role among European donors.

As a consequence, the new space for top-down Europeanization created by the Treaty of Maastricht remained in the 1990s almost unfulfilled. As earlier, bottom-up and horizontal shifts constituted major dimensions of the Europeanization process. The horizontal dimension now strengthened thanks to consultations before important sessions of the Development Council of Ministers and other interactions among the group of the so-called like-minded states, highly emphasizing development assistance in their external policies – Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark (Arts, Dickson eds., 2003).
5. Coordination within the context of millennium development efforts. Europeanization of ODA volumes

Due to persisting insufficiencies, the development area represented a part of a broader reform shift imposed at the beginning of the new millennium. The reform initiatives not only reflected the pure necessity to meet the requirements deriving from the Treaty of Maastricht. They also responded to the strong critical voices and mirrored the new elements in global development aid patterns based on the UN Millennium, the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development of March 2002, the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation of February 2003, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action. In accordance with the European attempts so far, the initiatives sought a better division of tasks among development assistance providers and cooperation with recipients.

In 2000s, the top-down pressure on Member States strengthened gradually. The initiatives of European institutions (especially of the Commission), as well as the number of soft-law instruments regulating development policy and assistance increased rapidly since the reform process at the level of the EU started in April 2000 with the Commission communication on The European Community’s Development Policy. The so-called Barcelona commitments, later elaborated in the European Consensus on Development, and the “package on aid effectiveness” may be considered the core. In general, it is possible to say that the open method of coordination was gradually introduced into this area, as the new soft law created all its major elements step by step – initial objectives and indicators, national planning and reporting, peer review procedures, as well as re-elaboration of targets and plans in accordance with experience gained and lessons learned during implementation (Trubek and Trubek, 2005; Kröger, 2009).

A set of initial targets was included in the Barcelona commitments, approved by the spring European Council in 2002 and later amended by the Council Conclusions of May 2005. The targets responded to broader international trends within the area of financing for development but, regarding the old EU Member States (EU_15), they reached beyond international requirements as the general UN target of 0.7 % ODA/GNI ratio was refined by interim national aims until 2006 and 2010. As far as the new entrants of 2004 and 2007 are concerned, a special ratio of 0.2% ODA/GNI was introduced.

The interim national aims have been under a periodical scrutiny of the European Commission in its annual report on progress toward implementing commitments on development finance. As obvious from the reports, several old Member States (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Luxembourg) had already exceeded the UN target of 0.7% prior to the adoption of the Barcelona
commitments and thus, no domestic change was necessary. In contrast, Denmark used the opportunity to gradually reduce its target to 0.8% of GNI.

Among the Members who had to adapt their national approaches to the Barcelona commitments, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom substantially increased their ODA/GNI ratio and met or moved close to meeting their targets both in 2006 and 2010. Austria, France, and Germany made substantial progress toward achieving required ODA/GNI levels in the first half of the 2000s but, since then, their efforts have eased. The remaining countries – Italy, Greece, and Portugal – could not live up to the agreed individual targets by 2006, and even by 2010, as the latest data indicate (European Commission, 2010).

The differences between groups reflect to some extent the fact that, in accordance with the logic of voluntarism, the Barcelona commitments did not recommend methods of achieving the desired targets. Thus, in some cases like Austria, France, Germany, or Italy, the increase was achieved through debt relief grants which were not sustainable in the long-term. Most recently, these differences have also resulted from austerity measures (including aid cuts) introduced by Member States in response to the global economic crisis. These measures were also responsible for the worsening positions of Germany and Austria in 2009, as well as Italy and Greece in 2009 and 2010.

Analogical developments could be observed among new member countries (EU_10 in 2004 - 2006, EU_12 since 2007). Four states’ figures (Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus) steadily increased since their entry into the EU up until 2009. With the exception of Lithuania, which was hard hit by the economic crisis, these countries were expected to meet or almost meet their individual targets by 2010. Yet, because Malta’s and Slovenia’s ODA/GNI ratio decreased in 2010, Cyprus was the only new member above the committed value. Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania achieved some progress but lagged behind the desired value which even worsened due to the economic crisis. The remaining EU_12 countries were off-track as their ODA/GNI ratio stagnated or decreased. Unlike the EU_15, the divergences also reflect the very different starting positions of individual EU_12 countries and the far-reaching transformation processes which many of them had to undergo in the recent past.

As well as making commitments regarding the total volumes of ODA, Member States also promised to direct 50% of aid increases to Africa. The promise was kept by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Several states (France, Portugal, Ireland, UK) did not attempt to fulfil the promise as the African share in their own ODA had been high in the first place. Another type of reluctance appeared among the new Members, most of who contributed to Africa through multilateral channels. An increase in bilateral ODA to Africa was only considered in some of these countries. As a consequence, the
target was only half-fulfilled (26% according to the European Commission, 2011a).

After promising results in the first half of the 2000s, the EU scaling-up process has been uneven across Member States since the outbreak of the global economic crisis. The European Commission, as well as the Council attempted a revitalization with several additional measures which included the adoption of new intermediate targets by 2012 (0.57% ODA/GNI (EU_15), and 0.22% (EU_12) respectively), as well as a requirement that the Member States develop national action plans and multi-annual timetables outlining how they would scale up. The measures lead to many different responses from Member States.

Timetables were soon adopted by several countries, but in different forms, reaching from legally binding commitments in development legislation or national budget law to framework development policy documents simply indicating their strategies (European Commission, 2010). Other states launched domestic debates almost immediately but the preparatory works were time consuming – mostly due to domestic procedural rules. The number of reluctant countries showing no intention to develop such timetables was also relatively high. It exclusively included states lagging behind the desired volumes. Several of these countries were not interested in adopting the national action plans and they even considered restricting their scaling-up process (European Commission, 2008). Their attitudes reflected, above all, various domestic obstacles to better progress toward the desired targets. In most countries, the obstacles were closely connected with high adaptation costs as the increase in available resources would have to be sizable and would require cuts in other items of public or private expenditures, hardly enforceable in the context of the on-going global economic turmoil.

The Commission attempted to confront the Member States’ reluctance by strengthening the cross-loading and recently proposed a EU-internal ODA “peer review” mechanism. The mechanism complements the existing (continuously improved) annual reporting based on self-assessment questionnaires collected from all Member States. It consists of a regular presentation of Member States’ achievements at the spring session of FAC (development) and subsequent reports on the results and progress to the European Council.

In addition, the Commission also envisaged a search for new innovative resources for financing development, again in a broader international context of e.g. the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development created in 2006 in Paris which today comprises almost 60 states. Despite the fact that EU Member States were very supportive of the new, innovative resources, only about a third of them (predominantly belonging to the EU_15) were able to use them for fund raising (European Commission, 2010).
6. Qualitative aspects of development assistance at the beginning of the new millennium

Nevertheless, the coordination of Member States by the EU was never thought to be limited solely to the quantitative aspects of development assistance. It was also about the improvements in the quality and effectiveness of the European Union and Member States’ bilateral aid. For example, the guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community and the Member States for external aid from January 2001 intended to avoid any unnecessary duplications, to help lessen the administrative burden for partner countries, promote local cooperation on implementation issues, and maximise added value for partner countries.

At the same time, coordination was to be centred at all important stages in Member States and Community programming (identification, implementation, evaluation, and feed-back). Following more general trends at the beginning of the new millennium, the Commission finally exceeded the previous operational dimension of its coordination activities and moved to a more general level of country strategy and sectoral policy guidelines (European Commission, 2010). It also envisaged several institutional improvements, regular monitoring (e.g. by the regular Monterrey reports) and a new system of the division of labour in which the EU would focus only on a few priority areas, where its action represented an added value, whereas the other would be left to Member States.

Despite the fact that (unlike the quantitative aspects of development assistance where clear targets were determined by the Barcelona Commitments and voluntarism introduced) requirements regarding Member States’ actions were not defined in this case, the redefinition of European development and the creation of a new, ambitious agenda at the level of the EU within the context of changing international approaches quickly translated into growing Member States’ awareness and recognition as far as the European level of policy making is concerned. As a consequence, the EU gradually began to be taken into account when national policies were formulated although primarily again as a possible extension of the national policy space rather through up-loading than a source of challenges which should be met (down-loaded) at the domestic level.

As typical for Europeanization processes (c.f. e.g. Vink, Graziano, 2007), the extent and timing of domestic response to the emerging new shape of European development assistance differed across individual Member States. Thus, only five countries of the EU_15 changed their national legislation regarding development assistance in the period of 2001 – 2005. Four countries continued to use an earlier legislative base for their policies and six, following their governance, legal, and administrative traditions and ODA organizational structures, have not adopted legislative measures within the area at all.

To give examples, Italy may be mentioned as a country which responded neither to the change of international paradigms, nor to the European trends and
was not able to accommodate its insufficient development legislation of 1987 due to a lack of cross-party political consensus on its reform measures (OECD-DAC, 2009). In contrast, the Swedish government bill of May 2003 – Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development – might be mentioned as one of the pioneering achievements. It repeatedly stressed the need for closer cooperation within the EU (Shared Responsibility…, 2003), as well as the importance of the EU when promoting Swedish efforts and the pioneering shift to sustainable and equitable development. The same was true for the Portuguese government’s strategic vision of development cooperation of 2006, especially in those cases where European commitments are consistent with governmental intentions and may serve as a source of their legitimacy (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2006).

In addition, some of the European states responded by improving organizational patterns and included a scrutiny of European policies and law into their domestic coordination bodies. For example, the Dutch policy coherence unit within the ministry of foreign affairs (established in 2002) was, inter alia, obliged to screen European legislative proposals and their development impacts (OECD, 2009).

However, the European Commission admitted in its communication of 2006, “EU Aid: Delivering more, better and faster”, that despite all its efforts and apparent progress in relation to some recipient countries, the qualitative aspects of ODA lagged behind the quantitative ones at least until the middle of the 2000s. Similarly, the first edition of the EU Donor Atlas showed two negative aspects – a concentration of aid in certain attractive countries and sectors, creating forgotten countries and sectors, and a fragmentation of activities in preferred countries/sectors, with a multiplication of actors and small-scale projects.

7. European Consensus on Development and beyond

Persistent insufficiencies were addressed in the European Consensus on Development of 2005 (Council of the EU, 2005) – the first European document to contain a shared vision of principles, values, and objectives, as well as political aspirations on which the European development aid could be based. For the direction of Member State development policies, the first part of the Consensus entitled “The EU vision of development” was of special importance. It should “guide Community and Member State development cooperation activities in all developing countries in a spirit of complementarity“ (p. 3) and help them meet their commitments “to poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development“ (ibid.).

Regarding a possible impact of a coordinated development policy on the Member States, the EU Aid Effectiveness Action Plan, presented in 2006...
(European Commission 2006), and the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy of 2007 (European Commission 2007) are of special importance. The Code of Conduct contains concrete measures to enhance complementarity (between the European and national aid programmes) and division of labour among EU donors. The principles are addressed especially in its in-country, cross-country, and cross-sector dimensions. Their aim is the reduction of donor involvement in the concrete activities of developing countries which should reduce costs of aid management, overlapping activities, and add value by donor specialization in fields where their performance is outstanding. The practical observance of these policies shall be safeguarded through ten guiding principles.5

As the Code of Conduct is not a legally binding document, Member States are encouraged to follow its principles (and to change their development policies in response to a top-down adaptation pressure) by several political incentives. They include, inter alia, joint programming, joint assistance strategies, regular monitoring, and the best practices evaluation, as well as constantly extended publication of achievements. However, the complete fulfilment of the Code of Conduct and the subsequent initiatives by Member States are considered to be long-term matters and, therefore, they are also referred to as “a work in progress” (European Commission, 2010, p. 3) or an “emerging phenomenon” (OECD, 2011, Annex 5, p. 4).

Thus, it is too early to evaluate the impact of the Code of Conduct on the EU Member States ODA due to the inevitable time lag between political decisions on aid allocation and their actual implementation traceable in relevant data sets. However, the EU Fast-track Initiative Monitoring Report of 2009 concentrates on the activities of Member States and mentions several positive achievements from the perspective of recipients (e.g. the decrease of transaction costs in six target countries, the improvement in sector dialogue with some of them, and the changing approaches of Member States). One of the most recent documents, the Enhancing EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development, confirms Member States’ continuing efforts to refine working methods in the field of development aid. But, at the same time, it points out persisting broad differences between individual countries and mentions both endeavour by some of them, as well as reluctance by others (European Commission, 2011b). This strongly corresponds with the previous

5 Concentrate activities in-country on focal sectors, redeploy other activities in-country, ensure an adequate EU presence in strategic sectors, replicate practices in the cooperation with partner regional institutions, establish priority countries, address the “orphan” countries of aid allocations, analyse and expand global areas of strength, pursue progress on the vertical and cross-modality/instruments dimensions of complementarity, promote jointly the division of labour, deepen the reforms of aid systems.
Europeanization research findings on the differential impacts of Europe (cf. Héritier, 2001) and the great variability of domestic responses to integration and decision making at the level of the EU (cf. Héritier, 2001; Börzel, 2003).

While implementing the Consensus, the differences between old and new Member States are confirmed again. It shows that most of the old Member States proceed more rapidly. Their development assistance policies are thus more Europeanized than those of the new ones. As far as the new Members are concerned, indicators selected for the monitoring of the Consensus are fulfilled in a few exceptional cases.

On the other hand, as emerging donors with still relatively modest assistance programmes, the new Members focus on a small number of priority and partner countries that might be consistent with the requirement of the cross-country division of labour. As the geographical distribution of the programmes is primarily influenced by national policy priorities and needs (cf. Bucar, Plibersec, Mesic, 2006), the choice of the target countries differs from the old Members substantially and there are few partners common for both groups.

In general, older Member States, with only a few exceptions, took measures to increase aid for Africa, used budget support, and fully or partially integrated the principles of the Code of Conduct into their national strategies. The most positive values which occur in the selected indicators of the in-country division of labour (in particular the delegated cooperation criterion) suggest that they are ready to specialize and to leave some (less strategic) sectors.

In contrast, there are small differences in the numbers of priority countries in 2005 and 2010 which confirm the findings of Grimm, Schulz and Horký (2009) that it is extremely difficult to achieve a division of labour at the cross-country level, as it means that several recipient countries must be abandoned by some donors. As for the new Members, it is also true for the older ones that the geographical scope of the development aid is a solely national choice closely related to foreign policy interests and needs.

8. Conclusions

Although the inquiry into the Europeanization of official development assistance (as well as development policy in a broader sense) offered by this paper cannot be exhaustive, it helps address several important research questions. First, it simply confirms the fact that ODA belongs to the fields where Europeanization appears and should be taken into account by the Europeanization research. Second, its findings show that a more detailed investigation of European and national ODA policies, and their mutual relations respectively, could deepen the existing knowledge on the various impacts of European policy-making on Member States. Of course, one could admit that the national responses to events at the level of the EU recorded in previous sections of the paper seem to be similar to those observed in other policy areas and their
study is, thus, likely to prove merely the results of previous research. However, as the Europeanization of development assistance occurs solely within the cooperation - communication governance mode,\(^6\) the domestic change is achieved by adaptation mechanisms differing from those usually observed within other policy areas.

As far as the Europeanization of ODA itself is concerned, the close relation between domestic change and the form of governance is obvious. However, it is necessary to point out that the general labelling of the mode (communication - cooperation) seems to be somewhat imprecise. In fact, there are many modalities hidden within the term – from communication and soft cooperation without any legal base to open coordination based on the primary law and a multitude of secondary (legally non-binding) documents. The intensity and shape of Europeanization processes is related to the evolution of the mode – whereas at the earliest stages of the creation of the mode the up-loading and cross-loading prevailed, with the elaboration of the mode down-loading (or a top-down impact of Europe) intensifies. The evolution of the mode seems to be the interplay between Member States and the community bodies, especially the Commission. On the one hand, it reflects the readiness of Member States to transfer some of their tasks to the level of the EU. On the other hand, the Commission may be rather creative, as far as the use of the scope and authority shifted to it in primary legislation. Thus, the activity of the Commission should be reserved for another important factor working upon Europeanization within this area.

Furthermore, the stage of development of the communication - cooperation governance mode is reflected not only in the prevailing directions of Europeanization but also in features where domestic change appears. Originally, it was limited to the geographical distribution and (to some extent) channelling of ODA. With the expansion of European governance within this field in the 1990s and, especially, in the 2000s, it also began to manifest itself in the ODA volumes and in the entire character of Member States’ national development programmes. The domestic responses to the new European governance toolkits (particularly the ODA/GNI targets, the Consensus on Development, and the Code of Conduct) vary across the Member States, both between the EU-15 and EU_12 and within these two groups. Discussion of the possible sources of these differences goes beyond the scope of this paper and remains open for further research, especially to cross-country comparative studies. Nevertheless, some partial aspects were clarified when dealing with the Member States’ reluctance

\(^6\) When recalling development policy in a broader sense, the portrait of governance patterns would be somewhat different. Some elements of development policy are implemented e.g. within common trade policy, where coercion and competition modes are present.
to implement measures contrary to their national interest, as well as with the consequences of different timing of Member States’ national policy circles.

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